Amendments to 812.16

1. United States v. Morton

   467 U.S. 822 (1984)   Cited 398 times

   See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-1592 (1982); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 31-146 (1962); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code Ann. § 706.154(b) (West Supp. 1984); Idaho Code § 8-510 (1979); Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 110, § 12-812 (1983); Ind. Code § 34-1-11-29 (1982); Iowa Code § 642.18 (1983); Md. Cts. Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 11-601(a) (1984); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 246, § 43 (West 1959); Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.4061(3) (1968); Minn. Stat. § 571.54 (1982); Miss. Code Ann. § 11-35-37 (1972); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 525.070 (1978); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 512:38 (1983-1984); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:17-53 (West Supp. 1984); N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 5209 (McKinney 1978); N.D. Cent. Code § 32-09.1-15 (Supp. 1983); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2716.21(D) (Supp. 1983); Okla. Stat., Tit. 12, § 1233 (1961); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 29.195 (1983); S.D. Codified Laws § 21-18-32 (1979); Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-7-117 (1980); Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 12, § 3081 (1973); Wash. Rev. Code § 7.33.200 (1983); W. Va. Code § 38-7-25 (1966); Wis. Stat. § 812.16(2) (1981-1982); Wyo. Stat. § 1-15-302 (1977).

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2. Walters v. U.S. Attorney Gen.

   No. 15-10154 (11th Cir. Sep. 15, 2015)

   Here, the BIA and IJ did not err in concluding that Petitioner's chop shop conviction under Florida Statute § 812.16 was a crime involving moral turpitude. Petitioner contends that his § 812.16 conviction did not involve moral turpitude because a person could be convicted under that statute for merely having the imputed knowledge that a private location is being used as a chop shop. However, this argument ignores the fact that, by its plain language, § 812.16 criminalizes the knowing ownership, operation, or conducting of a chop shop or the aiding and abetting of such conduct. Fla. Stat. § 812.16( 1)(a), (2). Thus, a § 812.16 conviction requires, at the very least, knowingly aiding and abetting the operation of a shop designed to conceal or house stolen parts of motor vehicles, not merely knowing that a location is used as a chop shop. See id. This concealment of parts of motor vehicles that a defendant knows to be stolen necessarily involves dishonesty, which has been recognized by binding precedent as involving moral turpitude. See Itani, 298 F.3d at 1215-16; cf. Matter of Salvail, 17 I. & N. Dec. 19, 20 (BIA 1979) (finding that…

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3. United States v. Frazier

   21 Cr. (AJN) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2021)

   1 more...

   WHEREAS, the Defendant consents to the entry of a money judgment in the amount of $1, 429, 812.16 in United States currency representing the amount of proceeds traceable to the offenses charged in Counts One and Two of the Information that the Defendant personally obtained; *
4. Bruce v. Beary

   498 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2007)   Cited 66 times   2 Legal Analyses

   • Motion for summary judgment
   4 more...

   Shortly thereafter, Bruce was arrested and charged with possession of loose VIN plates in violation of Fla. Stat. § 319.30(5)(b), and with operating a "chop shop," in violation of Fla. Stat. § 812.16(2).

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5. Kelley v. State

   720 So. 2d 272 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)

   There was sufficient evidence that the stolen vehicle or major component parts thereof for which restitution was properly ordered were present at appellant's place of business. By pleading guilty, he waived any issue as to his guilt. See Crusoe v. State, 239 So.2d 147 (Fla. 2d DCA 1970). It is not necessary that the State offer evidence of appellant's actual involvement in the theft of the vehicles for which restitution is ordered. See § 812.16(3), Fla. Stat. (1995).

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6. Vargas v. State

   34 So. 3d 44 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)   Cited 4 times

   § 812.16(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2004) (emphasis added).

   PAGE 46
7. Beck v. Bidrx, LLC

   2018 WI App. 61 (Wis. Ct. App. 2018)   Cited 3 times

   2 more...

   ¶ 24 The Becks respond by pointing to WIS. STAT. § 812.16( 2), which allows the court to "adjudge the recovery of any debt." But § 812.16( 2) does not say anything about a judgment against the debtor; it speaks of "[t]he judgment against a garnishee." Although BidRX as the debtor had the right to "defend the garnishment action upon any ground upon which [the] garnishee might defend" and could "participate in the trial," see WIS. STAT. § 812.15(1), the action remains one to recover property held by the garnishee, see WIS. STAT. § 812.01(1).¶ 25 The Becks also suggest WIS. STAT. § 242.07 gives the court broad equitable authority when assets have been fraudulently transferred. But as we have already concluded, the elements of fraudulent transfer were not established.¶ 26 While we understand the Becks are pursuing collection of amounts owed by BidRX, no authority provided supports a judgment against the underlying nongarnishee debtor in this proceeding. A garnishment judgment against BMO Harris for its BidRX-owned accounts could be a different story. But that is not the judgment we have before us. In short, if there is an argument supporting the circuit court’s…

   PAGE 221
8. Prince Corp. v. Vandenberg

   2016 WI 49 (Wis. 2016)   Cited 7 times

   • Motion to dismiss

   Wisconsin Stat. § 812.16(1) provides, “No trial shall be had of the garnishment action until the plaintiff has judgment in the principal action.” No party has asserted that § 812.16(1) required the DOR to reduce its tax warrants to judgments before it was eligible to garnish a portion of the final land contract payment. Therefore, we assume, without deciding, that § 812.16(1) does not apply under the circumstances presented by this case.

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9. Kuria v. BMLRW, LLLP

   101 So. 3d 425 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)   Cited 7 times

   On January 4, 2008, Freddie Smith, III, while at an apartment complex owned and operated by the Appellees, was engaged in the commission of operating a “chop shop” in violation of section 812.16, Florida Statutes, and dealing in stolen property in violation of section 812.019, Florida Statutes, both felonies. Mr. Smith was fatally shot at the apartment complex. His estate subsequently brought a negligence action alleging that the Appellees failed to provide adequate security measures and that those failures were a direct and proximate cause of Mr. Smith's death.

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10. Prince Corp. v. Vandenberg

    369 Wis. 2d 387 (Wis. 2016)

    • Motion to dismiss

    Wisconsin Stat. § 812.16(1) provides, “No trial shall be had of the garnishment action until the plaintiff has judgment in the principal action.” No party has asserted that § 812.16(1) required the DOR to reduce its tax warrants to judgments before it was eligible to garnish a portion of the final land contract payment. Therefore, we assume, without deciding, that § 812.16(1) does not apply under the circumstances presented by this case.

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