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Statutes updated from Official Statutes on: January 26, 2022
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In eight States, the main fraud and deceit statutes in effect in 1996 had relevant monetary thresholds of $10,000. However, a number of these States also had statutes targeted at particular kinds of fraud without any relevant monetary threshold. Connecticut: see, e.g.,Conn. Gen.Stat. §§ 53a–119, 53a–122 (1996); but see, e.g., §§ 53a–128c, 53a–128i (credit card crimes, no relevant monetary threshold). Florida: see, e.g.,Fla. Stat. §§ 812.012, 812.014 (1996); but see, e.g., §§ 817.234 (insurance fraud), 817.61 (fraudulent use of credit cards) (1996), both without a relevant monetary threshold. Illinois: see, e.g.,Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 720, § 5/16–1 (West 1996); but see, e.g., §§ 5/17–6 (state benefits fraud), 5/17–9 (public aid wire fraud), 5/17–10 (public aid mail fraud), 5/17–13 (fraudulent land sales), all without a relevant monetary threshold. Iowa: see, e.g.,Iowa Code §§ 714.1, 714.2, 714.8, 714.9 (1996). Maine: see, e.g., Me.Rev.Stat. Ann., Tit. 17A, §§ 354, 362 (1996); but see, e.g., §§ 902 (defrauding a creditor), 908 (home repair fraud), both without relevant monetary thresholds. North Dakota: see, e.g., N.D. Cent.Code Ann. §§ 12.1–23–02, 12.1–23–05 (1996)… As to Petitioner's claim that the indictment was defective because Petitioner was not independently found guilty of forgery or theft, Petitioner points to no authority holding that a defendant must first be found guilty of forgery or theft before he can be indicted under § 817.61. Critically here, Petitioner does not allege, much less establish, that the court failed to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as to the elements of § 817.61.Section 817.61 is based on section 4 of the Model Act. However, section 817.61 differs from section 4 of the Model Act in two significant respects. First, the Florida Legislature added a provision in section 817.61 that raises the level of the severity of the offense if the credit card is used more than two times within a six-month period. Under section 4 of the Model Act, the level of the severity of the offense is based only on the amount of value obtained within a six-month period, not the number of times the credit card is used. Second, under section 4 of the Model Act, the threshold of the value obtained within a six-month period sufficient to raise the severity of the offense is set at $500. In section 817.61, the Florida Legislature set the threshold of the value obtained within a six-month period sufficient to raise the severity of the offense substantially lower at $100.contrary to Section 817.61, Florida Statutes....Chapter 817 is entitled Fraudulent Practices. It is divided into three parts. This case involves a violation of part II, Credit Card Crimes. Sections 817.60 and 817.61 are included in part II. A.M. was charged and tried for a violation of section 817.61.Key's analysis of Fla. Stat. § 817.61 (2008) centers on Washington's forgery (under former RCW 9A.60.020), identity theft in the second degree (under former RCW 9.35.020) and theft by deception (RCW 9A.56.020(1)(b)).That portion of the information charging fraudulent use of a credit card alleged that Keels, on a particular date, obtained "goods and services" from the victim in the amount of $17.12 through the use of a credit card issued in a third person's name. The information further alleged that Keels was in unlawful possession of the credit card and used it with the intent to defraud the victim contrary to section 817.61, Florida Statutes (1999). Section 817.61 is titled "Fraudulent use of credit cards." It states, in pertinent part: "A person who, in any 6-month period, uses a credit card in violation of this section two or fewer times, or obtains money, goods, services, or anything else in violation of this section the value of which is less than $100, is subject to the penalties set forth in s. 817.67(1)." Section 817.67(1) provides that "[a] person who is subject to the penalties of this subsection shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083."According to the trial court's order denying relief, Ross's convictions for fraudulent use of a credit card, in violation of section 817.61, Florida Statutes (1991), and grand theft, in violation of section 812.014(2)(c)(1), Florida Statutes (1991), arose out a single transaction. Because section 817.61 contains a monetary element, this case is controlled by State v. McDonald, 690 So.2d 1317 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997), in which this court affirmed a trial court order dismissing a grand theft charge.According to the trial court's order denying relief, Ross's convictions for fraudulent use of a credit card, in violation of section 817.61, Florida Statutes (1991), and grand theft, in violation of section 812.014(2)(c)(1), Florida Statutes (1991), arose out a single transaction. Because section 817.61 contains a monetary element, this case is controlled by State v. McDonald, 690 So.2d 1317 (Fla.2d DCA 1997), in which this court affirmed a trial court order dismissing a grand theft charge. InMcDonald, the defendant was convicted of credit card fraud by a person authorized to provide goods or services, a violation of section 817.62, Florida Statutes (1993). Subsequent to this conviction, the State charged the defendant with grand theft, in violation of section 812.014(2)(c)(1), Florida Statutes (1993), based on the same actions that resulted in the first conviction. The defendant moved to dismiss this charge, and the motion was granted.Upon review pursuant to Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), we find no reversible error and affirm Appellant's judgment and sentence. We write only to correct a scrivener's error in the judgment. See Ashley v. State , 850 So. 2d 1265, 1268 n.3 (Fla. 2003) (defining a scrivener's error as a written clerical error that is not "the result of a judicial determination or error"). The judgment incorrectly lists sections 817.61 and 817.67, Florida Statutes, on the grand theft count, and section 812.014, Florida Statutes, on the fraudulent use of a credit card counts. On remand, the trial court shall correct the judgment to accurately list each statute to correspond with the crime. Appellant need not be present for this ministerial correction to the judgment. See Walton v. State , 106 So. 3d 522, 529 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) ("[A] defendant need not be present at resentencing if the error to be corrected is ‘purely ministerial’ or clerical, and involves no exercise of the court's discretion.").