Home
Menu
Call attorney Graham Syfert at 904-383-7448
Personal Injury Lawyer
Florida Statute 823 | Lawyer Caselaw & Research
F.S. 823 Case Law from Google Scholar
Statute is currently reporting as:
Link to State of Florida Official Statute Google Search for Amendments to 823

The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)

Title XLVI
CRIMES
Chapter 823
PUBLIC NUISANCES
View Entire Chapter
CHAPTER 823
CHAPTER 823
PUBLIC NUISANCES
823.01 Nuisances; penalty.
823.02 Building bonfires.
823.04 Animals suffering from disease or pests.
823.041 Disposal of bodies of dead animals; penalty.
823.05 Places and groups engaged in certain activities declared a nuisance; abatement and enjoinment.
823.06 Doors of public buildings to open outward.
823.07 Iceboxes, refrigerators, deep-freeze lockers, clothes washers, clothes dryers, or airtight units; abandonment, discard.
823.08 Iceboxes, refrigerators, deep-freeze lockers, clothes washers, clothes dryers, or similar airtight units abandoned or discarded; attractive nuisance.
823.09 Violation of s. 823.07; penalty.
823.10 Place where controlled substances are illegally kept, sold, or used declared a public nuisance.
823.11 Derelict vessels; relocation or removal; penalty.
823.12 Smoking in elevators unlawful; penalty.
823.13 Places where obscene materials are illegally kept, sold, or used declared a public nuisance; drive-in theaters, films visible from public streets or public places.
823.14 Florida Right to Farm Act.
823.145 Disposal by open burning of certain materials used in agricultural operations.
823.15 Public or private animal agencies; sterilization required for dogs and cats released; recordkeeping requirements; microchipping.
823.151 Lost or stray dogs and cats.
823.16 Sport shooting ranges; definitions; exemption from liability; exemption from specified rules; exemption from nuisance actions; continued operation.
823.01 Nuisances; penalty.All nuisances that tend to annoy the community, injure the health of the citizens in general, or corrupt the public morals are misdemeanors of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.083, except that a violation of s. 823.10 is a felony of the third degree.
History.s. 47, Feb. 10, 1832; RS 2704; GS 3680; RGS 5624; CGL 7817; s. 932, ch. 71-136; s. 32, ch. 73-334; s. 66, ch. 74-383; s. 1, ch. 75-24; s. 41, ch. 75-298; s. 18, ch. 83-214; s. 3, ch. 2001-57.
823.02 Building bonfires.Whoever is concerned in causing or making a bonfire within 10 rods of any house or building shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
History.s. 12, ch. 1637, 1868; RS 2705; GS 3681; RGS 5625; CGL 7818; s. 933, ch. 71-136; s. 66, ch. 74-383; s. 1, ch. 75-24; s. 41, ch. 75-298.
823.04 Animals suffering from disease or pests.It is unlawful for any person to bring into this state or to offer for sale herein any horses, mules, cattle, hogs, or other domestic animals, knowing at the time of such introduction or offering for sale of any such animals that they are suffering from contagious or infectious disease or any pests declared by rule of the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services to be a public nuisance and to be dangerous, transmissible, or a threat to the agricultural interest of the state. Any person convicted of such offense is guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
History.s. 1, ch. 4351, 1895; GS 3692; RGS 5637; CGL 7830; s. 935, ch. 71-136; s. 66, ch. 74-383; s. 1, ch. 75-24; s. 41, ch. 75-298; s. 4, ch. 84-72.
823.041 Disposal of bodies of dead animals; penalty.
(1) Any owner, custodian, or person in charge of domestic animals, upon the death of such animals due to disease, shall dispose of the carcasses of such animals by burning or burying at least 2 feet below the surface of the ground; provided, however, nothing in this section shall prohibit the disposal of such animal carcasses to rendering companies licensed to do business in this state.
(2) It is unlawful to dispose of the carcass of any domestic animal by dumping such carcass on any public road or right-of-way, or in any place where such carcass can be devoured by beast or bird.
(3) Any person violating any of the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
(4) For the purposes of this act, the words “domestic animal” shall include any equine or bovine animal, goat, sheep, swine, dog, cat, poultry, or other domesticated beast or bird.
History.ss. 1, 2, 3, 4, ch. 61-359; s. 936, ch. 71-136; s. 66, ch. 74-383; s. 1, ch. 75-24; s. 41, ch. 75-298.
823.05 Places and groups engaged in certain activities declared a nuisance; abatement and enjoinment.
(1) A person who erects, establishes, continues, maintains, owns, or leases any of the following is deemed to be maintaining a nuisance, and the building, erection, place, tent, or booth, and the furniture, fixtures, and contents of such structure, are declared a nuisance, and all such places or persons shall be abated or enjoined as provided in ss. 60.05 and 60.06:
(a) A building, booth, tent, or place that tends to annoy the community or injure the health of the community, or becomes manifestly injurious to the morals or manners of the people as provided in s. 823.01.
(b) A house or place of prostitution, assignation, or lewdness.
(c) A place or building in which persons engage in games of chance in violation of law.
(d) A place where any law of the state is violated.
(2)(a) As used in this subsection, the terms “criminal gang,” “criminal gang member,” “criminal gang associate,” and “criminal gang-related activity” have the same meanings as provided in s. 874.03.
(b) A criminal gang, criminal gang member, or criminal gang associate who engages in the commission of criminal gang-related activity is a public nuisance. All such persons shall be abated or enjoined as provided in ss. 60.05 and 60.06.
(c) The use of a location by a criminal gang, criminal gang members, or criminal gang associates for the purpose of engaging in criminal gang-related activity is a public nuisance. Such use of a location as a public nuisance shall be abated or enjoined as provided in ss. 60.05 and 60.06.
(d) This subsection does not prevent a local governing body from adopting and enforcing laws consistent with this chapter relating to criminal gangs and gang violence. Where local laws duplicate or supplement this chapter, this chapter shall be construed as providing alternative remedies and not as preempting the field.
(e) The state, through the Department of Legal Affairs or any state attorney, or any of the state’s agencies, instrumentalities, subdivisions, or municipalities having jurisdiction over conduct in violation of a provision of this chapter may institute civil proceedings under this subsection. In any action brought under this subsection, the circuit court shall proceed as soon as practicable to the hearing and determination. Pending final determination, the circuit court may at any time enter such injunctions, prohibitions, or restraining orders, or take such actions, including the acceptance of satisfactory performance bonds, as the court may deem proper.
(3) A massage establishment as defined in s. 480.033 which operates in violation of s. 480.0475 or s. 480.0535(2) is declared a nuisance and may be abated or enjoined as provided in ss. 60.05 and 60.06.
(4)(a) Any place or premises that has been used on more than two occasions within a 6-month period as the site of any of the following violations is declared a nuisance and may be abated or enjoined as provided in ss. 60.05 and 60.06:
1. Section 812.019, relating to dealing in stolen property.
2. Section 784.011, s. 784.021, s. 784.03, or s. 784.045, relating to assault and battery.
3. Section 810.02, relating to burglary.
4. Section 812.014, relating to theft.
5. Section 812.131, relating to robbery by sudden snatching.
(b) Notwithstanding any other law, a rental property that is declared a nuisance under this subsection may not be abated or subject to forfeiture under the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act if the nuisance was committed by someone other than the owner of the property and the property owner commences rehabilitation of the property within 30 days after the property is declared a nuisance and completes the rehabilitation within a reasonable time thereafter.
History.s. 1, ch. 7367, 1917; RGS 5639; CGL 7832; s. 24, ch. 57-1; s. 66, ch. 74-383; s. 1, ch. 75-24; s. 41, ch. 75-298; s. 4, ch. 2008-238; s. 5, ch. 2013-212; s. 2, ch. 2020-130; s. 21, ch. 2021-143.
823.06 Doors of public buildings to open outward.All buildings erected in this state for theatrical, operatic, or other public entertainments of whatsoever kind shall be so constructed that the shutters to all entrances to said building shall open outwardly and be so arranged as to readily allow any person inside said building to escape therefrom in case of fire or other accident. Any owner, manager, lessee, or other person having charge of any public building for the use expressed herein who fails to comply with the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
History.ss. 1, 3, ch. 4053, 1891; GS 3694; RGS 5640; CGL 7834; s. 937, ch. 71-136; s. 66, ch. 74-383; s. 1, ch. 75-24; s. 41, ch. 75-298.
823.07 Iceboxes, refrigerators, deep-freeze lockers, clothes washers, clothes dryers, or airtight units; abandonment, discard.
(1) The purpose of ss. 823.07-823.09 is to prevent deaths due to suffocation of children locked in abandoned or discarded iceboxes, refrigerators, deep-freeze lockers, clothes washers, clothes dryers, or similar airtight units from which the doors have not been removed.
(2) It is unlawful for any person knowingly to abandon or discard or to permit to be abandoned or discarded on premises under his or her control any icebox, refrigerator, deep-freeze locker, clothes washer, clothes dryer, or similar airtight unit having an interior storage capacity of 11/2 cubic feet or more from which the door has not been removed.
(3) The provisions of this section shall not apply to an icebox, refrigerator, deep-freeze locker, clothes washer, clothes dryer, or similar airtight unit which is crated or is securely locked from the outside or is in the normal use on the premises of a home, or rental unit, or is held for sale or use in a place of business; provided, however, that “place of business” as used herein shall not be deemed to include a junkyard or other similar establishment dealing in secondhand merchandise for sale on open unprotected premises.
(4) It shall be unlawful for any junkyard dealer or secondhand furniture dealer with unenclosed premises used for display of secondhand iceboxes, refrigerators, deep-freeze lockers, clothes washers, clothes dryers, or similar airtight units to fail to remove the doors on such secondhand units having an interior storage capacity of 11/2 cubic feet or more from which the door has not been removed. This section will not apply to any dealer who has fenced and locked his or her premises.
History.ss. 1, 2, ch. 29707, 1955; s. 1, ch. 67-135; s. 1, ch. 71-116; s. 66, ch. 74-383; s. 1, ch. 75-24; s. 41, ch. 75-298; s. 1278, ch. 97-102.
823.08 Iceboxes, refrigerators, deep-freeze lockers, clothes washers, clothes dryers, or similar airtight units abandoned or discarded; attractive nuisance.Abandoned or discarded iceboxes, refrigerators, deep-freeze lockers, clothes washers, clothes dryers, or similar airtight units from which the doors have not been removed are declared to be an attractive nuisance to children and a menace to their health and safety when accessible to them whether or not such children are trespassers.
History.s. 3, ch. 29707, 1955; s. 1, ch. 67-135; s. 2, ch. 71-116; s. 66, ch. 74-383; s. 1, ch. 75-24; s. 41, ch. 75-298.
823.09 Violation of s. 823.07; penalty.Any person violating any provision of s. 823.07, is guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083; provided, however, that in the event death of a minor child or permanent physical or mental injury to a minor child results from willful and wanton misconduct amounting to culpable negligence on the part of the person committing such violation, then such person shall be guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
History.s. 4, ch. 29707, 1955; s. 1, ch. 67-135; s. 938, ch. 71-136; s. 66, ch. 74-383; s. 1, ch. 75-24; s. 41, ch. 75-298.
823.10 Place where controlled substances are illegally kept, sold, or used declared a public nuisance.
(1) Any store, shop, warehouse, dwelling house, building, structure, vehicle, ship, boat, vessel, or aircraft, or any place whatever, which is visited by persons for the purpose of unlawfully using any substance controlled under chapter 893 or any drugs as described in chapter 499, or which is used for the illegal keeping, selling, or delivering of the same, shall be deemed a public nuisance. No person shall keep or maintain such public nuisance or aid and abet another in keeping or maintaining such public nuisance. Any person who willfully keeps or maintains a public nuisance or willfully aids or abets another in keeping or maintaining a public nuisance, and such public nuisance is a warehouse, structure, or building, commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(2) Any proceeding brought under this section shall be governed by chapter 60.
History.s. 1, ch. 69-364; s. 29, ch. 73-331; s. 66, ch. 74-383; s. 1, ch. 75-24; s. 41, ch. 75-298; s. 167, ch. 83-216; s. 2, ch. 96-237; s. 2, ch. 2001-57.
823.11 Derelict vessels; relocation or removal; penalty.
(1) As used in this section, the term:
(a) “Commission” means the Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission.
(b) “Derelict vessel” means a vessel, as defined in s. 327.02, that is:
1. In a wrecked, junked, or substantially dismantled condition upon any waters of this state.
a. A vessel is wrecked if it is sunken or sinking; aground without the ability to extricate itself absent mechanical assistance; or remaining after a marine casualty, including, but not limited to, a boating accident, extreme weather, or a fire.
b. A vessel is junked if it has been substantially stripped of vessel components, if vessel components have substantially degraded or been destroyed, or if the vessel has been discarded by the owner or operator. Attaching an outboard motor to a vessel that is otherwise junked will not cause the vessel to no longer be junked if such motor is not an effective means of propulsion as required by s. 327.4107(2)(e) and associated rules.
c. A vessel is substantially dismantled if at least two of the three following vessel systems or components are missing, compromised, incomplete, inoperable, or broken:
(I) The steering system;
(II) The propulsion system; or
(III) The exterior hull integrity.

Attaching an outboard motor to a vessel that is otherwise substantially dismantled will not cause the vessel to no longer be substantially dismantled if such motor is not an effective means of propulsion as required by s. 327.4107(2)(e) and associated rules.

2. At a port in this state without the consent of the agency having jurisdiction thereof.
3. Docked, grounded, or beached upon the property of another without the consent of the owner of the property.
(c) “Gross negligence” means conduct so reckless or wanting in care that it constitutes a conscious disregard or indifference to the safety of the property exposed to such conduct.
(d) “Willful misconduct” means conduct evidencing carelessness or negligence of such a degree or recurrence as to manifest culpability, wrongful intent, or evil design or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the interests of the vessel owner.
(2)(a) A person, firm, or corporation may not leave any derelict vessel upon waters of this state. For purposes of this paragraph, the term “leave” means to allow a vessel to remain occupied or unoccupied on the waters of this state for more than 24 hours.
(b) Notwithstanding paragraph (a), a person who owns or operates a vessel that becomes derelict upon the waters of this state solely as a result of a boating accident that is reported to law enforcement in accordance with s. 327.301 or otherwise reported to law enforcement; a hurricane; or another sudden event outside of his or her control may not be charged with a violation if:
1. The individual documents for law enforcement the specific event that led to the vessel being derelict upon the waters of this state; and
2. The vessel has been removed from the waters of this state or has been repaired or addressed such that it is no longer derelict upon the waters of this state:
a. For a vessel that has become derelict as a result of a boating accident or other sudden event outside of his or her control, within 7 days after such accident or event; or
b. Within 45 days after the hurricane has passed over the state.
(c) The additional time provided in subparagraph (b)2. for an owner or responsible party to remove a derelict vessel from the waters of this state or to repair and remedy the vessel’s derelict condition does not apply to a vessel that was derelict upon the waters of this state before the stated accident or event.
(d) Notwithstanding the additional 45 days provided in sub-subparagraph (b)2.b. during which an owner or a responsible party may not be charged for a violation of this section, the commission, an officer of the commission, a law enforcement agency or officer specified in s. 327.70, or, during a state of emergency declared by the Governor, the Division of Emergency Management or its designee, may immediately begin the process set forth in s. 705.103(2)(a) and, once that process has been completed and the 45 days provided herein have passed, any vessel that has not been removed or repaired such that it is no longer derelict upon the waters of this state may be removed and destroyed as provided therein.
(3) The commission, an officer of the commission, or a law enforcement agency or officer specified in s. 327.70 may relocate, remove, and store or cause to be relocated, removed, and stored a derelict vessel from waters of this state as defined in s. 327.02 if the derelict vessel obstructs or threatens to obstruct navigation or in any way constitutes a danger to the environment, property, or persons. The commission, an officer of the commission, or any other law enforcement agency or officer acting pursuant to this subsection to relocate, remove, and store or cause to be relocated, removed, and stored a derelict vessel from waters of this state shall be held harmless for all damages to the derelict vessel resulting from such action unless the damage results from gross negligence or willful misconduct.
(a) All costs, including costs owed to a third party, incurred by the commission, another law enforcement agency, or a governmental subdivision, when the governmental subdivision has received authorization from a law enforcement officer or agency, in the relocation, removal, storage, destruction, or disposal of a derelict vessel are recoverable against the vessel owner or the party determined to be legally responsible for the vessel being upon the waters of this state in a derelict condition. The Department of Legal Affairs shall represent the commission in actions to recover such costs. As provided in s. 705.103(4), a person who neglects or refuses to pay such costs may not be issued a certificate of registration for such vessel or for any other vessel or motor vehicle until such costs have been paid. A person who has neglected or refused to pay all costs of removal, storage, destruction, or disposal of a derelict vessel as provided in this section, after having been provided written notice via certified mail that such costs are owed, and who applies for and is issued a registration for a vessel or motor vehicle before such costs have been paid in full commits a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
(b) A contractor performing such activities at the direction of the commission, an officer of the commission, a law enforcement agency or officer, or a governmental subdivision, when the governmental subdivision has received authorization for the relocation or removal from a law enforcement officer or agency, pursuant to this section must be licensed in accordance with applicable United States Coast Guard regulations where required; obtain and carry in full force and effect a policy from a licensed insurance carrier in this state to insure against any accident, loss, injury, property damage, or other casualty caused by or resulting from the contractor’s actions; and be properly equipped to perform the services to be provided.
(4)(a) Removal of derelict vessels under this subsection may be funded by grants provided in s. 206.606.
(b) The commission may implement a plan for the procurement of any available federal disaster funds and use such funds for the removal of derelict vessels.
(c) The commission may establish a program to provide grants to local governments for the removal, storage, destruction, and disposal of derelict vessels from the waters of this state. This grant funding may also be used for the removal, storage, destruction, and disposal of vessels declared a public nuisance pursuant to s. 327.73(1)(aa). The program must be funded from the Marine Resources Conservation Trust Fund or the Florida Coastal Protection Trust Fund. Notwithstanding s. 216.181(11), funds available for these grants may only be authorized by appropriations acts of the Legislature. In a given fiscal year, if all funds appropriated pursuant to this paragraph are not requested by and granted to local governments for the removal, storage, destruction, and disposal of derelict vessels or vessels declared a public nuisance pursuant to s. 327.73(1)(aa) by the end of the third quarter, the Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission may use the remainder of the funds to remove, store, destroy, and dispose of, or to pay private contractors to remove, store, destroy, and dispose of, derelict vessels or vessels declared a public nuisance pursuant to s. 327.73(1)(aa). The commission shall adopt by rule procedures for local governments to submit a grant application and criteria for allocating available funds. Such criteria must include, at a minimum, the following:
1. The number of derelict vessels within the jurisdiction of the applicant.
2. The threat posed by such vessels to public health or safety, the environment, navigation, or the aesthetic condition of the general vicinity.
3. The degree of commitment of the local government to maintain waters free of abandoned and derelict vessels and to seek legal action against those who abandon vessels in the waters of this state as defined in s. 327.02.
(5) When a derelict vessel is docked, grounded, or beached upon private property without the consent of the owner of the property, the owner of the property may remove the vessel at the vessel owner’s expense 60 days after compliance with the notice requirements specified in s. 328.17(5). The private property owner may not hinder reasonable efforts by the vessel owner or the vessel owner’s agent to remove the vessel. Notice given pursuant to this subsection is presumed to be delivered when it is deposited with the United States Postal Service, certified, and properly addressed with prepaid postage.
(6) A person, firm, or corporation violating this section commits a misdemeanor of the first degree and shall be punished as provided by law. A conviction under this section does not bar the assessment and collection of a civil penalty. The court having jurisdiction over the criminal offense, notwithstanding any jurisdictional limitations on the amount in controversy, may order the imposition of such civil penalty in addition to any sentence imposed for the first criminal offense.
(7) If an owner or a responsible party of a vessel determined to be derelict through an administrative or criminal proceeding has been charged by an officer of the commission or any law enforcement agency or officer as specified in s. 327.70 under subsection (6) for a violation of subsection (2), a person may not reside or dwell on such vessel until the vessel is removed from the waters of the state permanently or returned to the waters of the state in a condition that is no longer derelict.
History.ss. 1, 2, 3, ch. 73-207; s. 17, ch. 89-268; s. 473, ch. 94-356; s. 258, ch. 99-245; s. 11, ch. 2006-309; s. 3, ch. 2014-143; s. 7, ch. 2019-54; s. 25, ch. 2020-158; s. 29, ch. 2021-184; s. 13, ch. 2022-142; s. 15, ch. 2023-304.
823.12 Smoking in elevators unlawful; penalty.It is unlawful for any person to possess any ignited tobacco product or other ignited substance while present in an elevator. Any person who violates this section is guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
History.s. 1, ch. 74-115; s. 15, ch. 83-145; s. 198, ch. 91-224.
823.13 Places where obscene materials are illegally kept, sold, or used declared a public nuisance; drive-in theaters, films visible from public streets or public places.
(1) Any store, shop, warehouse, building, vehicle, ship, boat, vessel, aircraft, or any place whatever, which is visited by persons for the purpose of unlawfully purchasing or viewing any obscene material or performance as described in chapter 847, or which is used for the illegal keeping, selling, or delivering of the same, shall be deemed a public nuisance. No person shall keep or maintain such public nuisance or aid and abet another in keeping or maintaining such public nuisance.
(2) It shall be unlawful and is hereby declared a public nuisance for any ticket seller, ticket taker, usher, motion picture projection machine operator, manager, owner, or any other person connected with or employed by any drive-in theater in the state to knowingly exhibit, or aid or assist in exhibiting, any motion picture, slide, or other exhibit which depicts nudity which is harmful to minors as described in s. 847.013, if such motion picture, slide, or other exhibit is visible from any public street or public place, other than that place intended for the showing of such motion pictures, slides, or other exhibits.
History.s. 1, ch. 78-172.
823.14 Florida Right to Farm Act.
(1) SHORT TITLE.This section shall be known and may be cited as the “Florida Right to Farm Act.”
(2) LEGISLATIVE FINDINGS AND PURPOSE.The Legislature finds that agricultural production is a major contributor to the economy of the state; that agricultural lands constitute unique and irreplaceable resources of statewide importance; that the continuation of agricultural activities preserves the landscape and environmental resources of the state, contributes to the increase of tourism, including agritourism, and furthers the economic self-sufficiency of the people of the state; and that the encouragement, development, improvement, and preservation of agriculture will result in a general benefit to the health and welfare of the people of the state. The Legislature further finds that agricultural activities conducted on farm land in urbanizing areas are potentially subject to lawsuits based on the theory of nuisance and that these suits encourage and even force the premature removal of the farm land from agricultural use. It is the purpose of this act to protect reasonable agricultural and complementary agritourism activities conducted on farm land from nuisance suits and other similar lawsuits.
(3) DEFINITIONS.As used in this section:
(a) “Agritourism activity” has the same meaning as provided in s. 570.86.
(b) “Established date of operation” means the date the farm operation commenced. For an agritourism activity, the term “established date of operation” means the date the specific agritourism activity commenced. If the farm operation is subsequently expanded within the original boundaries of the farm land, the established date of operation of the expansion shall also be considered as the date the original farm operation commenced. If the land boundaries of the farm are subsequently expanded, the established date of operation for each expansion is deemed to be a separate and independent established date of operation. The expanded operation shall not divest the farm operation of a previous established date of operation.
(c) “Farm” means the land, buildings, support facilities, machinery, and other appurtenances used in the production of farm or aquaculture products.
(d) “Farm operation” means all conditions or activities by the owner, lessee, agent, independent contractor, or supplier which occur on a farm in connection with the production of farm, honeybee, or apiculture products or in connection with complementary agritourism activities. These conditions and activities include, but are not limited to, the marketing of farm products at roadside stands or farm markets; the operation of machinery and irrigation pumps; the generation of noise, odors, dust, fumes, and particle emissions; ground or aerial seeding and spraying; the placement and operation of an apiary; the application of chemical fertilizers, conditioners, insecticides, pesticides, and herbicides; agritourism activities; and the employment and use of labor.
(e) “Farm product” means any plant, as defined in s. 581.011, or animal or insect useful to humans and includes, but is not limited to, any product derived therefrom.
(f) “Nuisance” means any interference with reasonable use and enjoyment of land, including, but not limited to, noise, smoke, odors, dust, fumes, particle emissions, or vibration. The term also includes all claims that meet the requirements of this definition, regardless of whether the plaintiff designates those claims as brought in nuisance, negligence, trespass, personal injury, strict liability, or other tort.
(4) FARM OPERATIONS; NUISANCE.
(a) No farm operation which has been in operation for 1 year or more since its established date of operation and which was not a nuisance at the time of its established date of operation shall be a public or private nuisance if the farm operation conforms to generally accepted agricultural and management practices, except that the following conditions shall constitute evidence of a nuisance:
1. The presence of untreated or improperly treated human waste, garbage, offal, dead animals, dangerous waste materials, or gases which are harmful to human or animal life.
2. The presence of improperly built or improperly maintained septic tanks, water closets, or privies.
3. The keeping of diseased animals which are dangerous to human health, unless such animals are kept in accordance with a current state or federal disease control program.
4. The presence of unsanitary places where animals are slaughtered, which may give rise to diseases which are harmful to human or animal life.
(b) No farm operation shall become a public or private nuisance as a result of a change in ownership, a change in the type of farm product being produced, a change in conditions in or around the locality of the farm, or a change brought about to comply with best management practices adopted by local, state, or federal agencies if such farm has been in operation for 1 year or more since its established date of operation and if it was not a nuisance at the time of its established date of operation.
(c) A farm may not be held liable for nuisance unless the plaintiff proves by clear and convincing evidence that the claim arises out of conduct that did not comply with state or federal environmental laws, regulations, or best management practices.
(d) A nuisance action may not be filed against a farm operation unless the real property affected by the conditions alleged to be a nuisance is located within one-half mile of the source of the activity or structure alleged to be a nuisance.
(5) WHEN EXPANSION OF OPERATION NOT PERMITTED.This act shall not be construed to permit an existing farm operation to change to a more excessive farm operation with regard to noise, odor, dust, or fumes where the existing farm operation is adjacent to an established homestead or business on March 15, 1982.
(6) LIMITATION ON DUPLICATION OF GOVERNMENT REGULATION.It is the intent of the Legislature to eliminate duplication of regulatory authority over farm operations as expressed in this subsection. Except as otherwise provided for in this section and s. 487.051(2), and notwithstanding any other provision of law, a local government may not adopt any ordinance, regulation, rule, or policy to prohibit, restrict, regulate, or otherwise limit an activity of a bona fide farm operation on land classified as agricultural land pursuant to s. 193.461, where such activity is regulated through implemented best management practices or interim measures developed by the Department of Environmental Protection, the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, or water management districts and adopted under chapter 120 as part of a statewide or regional program. When an activity of a farm operation takes place within a wellfield protection area as defined in any wellfield protection ordinance adopted by a local government, and the adopted best management practice or interim measure does not specifically address wellfield protection, a local government may regulate that activity pursuant to such ordinance. This subsection does not limit the powers and duties provided for in s. 373.4592 or limit the powers and duties of any local government to address an emergency as provided for in chapter 252.
(7) COMPENSATORY DAMAGES.When the alleged nuisance emanated from a farm operation, the compensatory damages that may be awarded to a plaintiff for a private nuisance action must be measured by the reduction in the fair market value of the plaintiff’s property caused by the nuisance, but may not exceed the fair market value of the property.
(8) PUNITIVE DAMAGES.Any punitive damages claim in a nuisance action brought against a farm is subject to ss. 768.71-768.81. Additionally, a plaintiff may not recover punitive damages in a nuisance action against a farm unless:
(a) The alleged nuisance is based on substantially the same conduct that was subject to a civil enforcement judgment or criminal conviction; and
(b) The conviction or judgment occurred within 3 years of the first action forming the basis of the nuisance action.
(9) NUISANCE ACTIONS BASED ON EXISTING FARM OPERATIONS.A plaintiff who fails to prevail in a nuisance action based on a farm operation that has been in existence for 1 year or more before the date that the action was instituted and that conforms with generally accepted agricultural and management practices or state and federal environmental laws is liable to the farm for all costs, fees, and expenses incurred in defense of the action.
History.s. 1, ch. 79-61; ss. 1, 2, ch. 82-24; s. 9, ch. 87-367; s. 75, ch. 93-206; s. 1279, ch. 97-102; s. 25, ch. 99-391; s. 39, ch. 2000-308; s. 13, ch. 2012-83; s. 1, ch. 2021-7; s. 65, ch. 2022-4.
823.145 Disposal by open burning of certain materials used in agricultural operations.Polyethylene agricultural plastic; damaged, nonsalvageable, untreated wood pallets; and packing material that cannot be feasibly recycled, which are used in connection with agricultural operations related to the growing, harvesting, or maintenance of crops, may be disposed of by open burning provided that no public nuisance or any condition adversely affecting the environment or the public health is created thereby and that state or federal national ambient air quality standards are not violated.
History.s. 2, ch. 87-337; ss. 8, 9, ch. 2011-7; HJR 7103, 2011 Regular Session.
823.15 Public or private animal agencies; sterilization required for dogs and cats released; recordkeeping requirements; microchipping.
(1) The Legislature has determined that the importation of dogs and cats into, and the uncontrolled breeding of dogs and cats in, this state pose risks to the well-being of dogs and cats, the health of humans and animals, and the agricultural interests in this state. Importation of dogs and cats from outside the United States could result in the transmission of diseases that have been eradicated in the United States to dogs and cats, other animals, and humans living in this state. Uncontrolled breeding results in the birth of many more puppies and kittens than are needed to provide pet animals to new owners or to replace pet animals that have died or become lost. This leads to many dogs, cats, puppies, and kittens being unwanted, becoming strays and suffering privation and death, being impounded and destroyed at great expense to the community, and constituting a public nuisance and public health hazard. It is therefore declared to be the public policy of the state that every feasible means be used to reduce the incidence of birth of unneeded and unwanted puppies and kittens. Determining which programs result in improved adoption rates and in reduced euthanasia rates for animals in shelters and animal control agencies is crucial to this effort.
(2)(a) Each public or private animal shelter, humane organization, or animal control agency operated by a humane organization or by a county, municipality, or other incorporated political subdivision, shall prepare and maintain the following records and make them available for public inspection and dissemination for the 3 preceding years. The following data will be available on a monthly basis commencing July 31, 2013:
1. The total number of dogs and cats taken in by the animal shelter, humane organization, or animal control agency, divided into species, in the following categories:
a. Surrendered by owner;
b. Stray;
c. Impounded;
d. Confiscated;
e. Transferred from within Florida;
f. Transferred into or imported from out of the state; and
g. Born in shelter.

Species other than domestic cats and domestic dogs should be recorded as “other.”

2. The disposition of all animals taken in by a public or private animal shelter, humane organization, or animal control agency operated by a humane society or by a county, municipality, or other incorporated political subdivision, divided into species. These data must include dispositions by:
a. Adoption;
b. Reclamation by owner;
c. Death in kennel;
d. Euthanasia at the owner’s request;
e. Transfer to another public or private animal shelter, humane organization, or animal control agency operated by a humane society or by a county, municipality, or other incorporated political subdivision;
f. Euthanasia;
g. Released in field/Trapped, Neutered, Released (TNR);
h. Lost in care/missing animals or records; and
i. Ending inventory/shelter count at end of the last day of the month.
3. A public or private animal shelter, humane organization, or animal control agency operated by a humane society, or by a county, municipality, or other incorporated political subdivision which routinely euthanizes dogs based on size or breed alone must provide a written statement of such policy. Dogs euthanized due to breed, temperament, or size must be recorded and included in the calculation of the total euthanasia percentage.
(b) Records of a public animal shelter, humane organization, or animal control agency operated by a humane society must be made available to the public pursuant to provisions in chapter 119.
(3) In furtherance of this policy, provision shall be made for the sterilization of all dogs and cats sold or released for adoption from any public or private animal shelter or animal control agency operated by a humane society or by a county, city, or other incorporated political subdivision, by either:
(a) Providing sterilization by a licensed veterinarian before relinquishing custody of the animal; or
(b) Entering into a written agreement with the adopter or purchaser guaranteeing that sterilization will be performed within 30 days or prior to sexual maturity. The shelter or animal control agency shall require a sufficient deposit from the adopter or purchaser, which deposit shall be refundable upon presentation to the shelter or animal control agency of written evidence by the veterinarian performing the sterilization that the animal has been sterilized. The deposit or donation may be based upon recommended guidelines established by the Florida Federation of Humane Societies. Failure by either party to comply with the provisions of this paragraph shall be a noncriminal violation as defined in s. 775.08(3), punishable by a fine, forfeiture, or other civil penalty, and, in addition thereto, the deposit or donation shall be forfeited to the shelter or animal control agency. Any legal fees or court costs used for the enforcement of this paragraph are the responsibility of the adopter. Upon the request of a licensed veterinarian, and for a valid reason, the shelter or animal control agency shall extend the time limit within which the animal must be sterilized.
(4) All costs of sterilization pursuant to this section shall be paid by the prospective adopter unless otherwise provided for by ordinance of the local governing body, with respect to animal control agencies or shelters operated or subsidized by a unit of local government, or provided for by the humane society governing body, with respect to an animal control agency or shelter operated solely by the humane society and not subsidized by public funds.
(5) Employees, agents, or contractors of a public or private animal shelter, a humane organization, or an animal control agency operated by a humane organization or by a county, municipality, or other incorporated political subdivision may implant dogs and cats with radio frequency identification microchips as part of their work with such public or private animal shelter, humane organization, or animal control agency.
(6) Notwithstanding s. 474.2165, employees, agents, or contractors of a public or private animal shelter, a humane organization, or an animal control agency operated by a humane organization or by a county, municipality, or other incorporated political subdivision may contact the owner of record listed on a radio frequency identification microchip to verify pet ownership.
History.ss. 1, 2, 3, ch. 80-87; s. 1, ch. 2013-32; s. 80, ch. 2020-160.
823.151 Lost or stray dogs and cats.
(1) The Legislature finds that natural disasters, such as hurricanes, may result in an increase in owned dogs and cats becoming lost or stray. The Legislature further finds that dog and cat owners statewide should be afforded the opportunity to quickly and reliably claim their lost pets. It is therefore declared to be the public policy of the state that animal control agencies and humane organizations shall adopt policies and procedures to help return lost cats or dogs to identified owners.
(2)(a) A public or private animal shelter, humane organization, or animal control agency operated by a humane organization or by a county, municipality, or other incorporated political subdivision that takes receivership of any lost or stray dogs or cats shall adopt written policies and procedures to ensure that every reasonable effort is made to quickly and reliably return owned animals to their owners. Such policies and procedures shall include:
1. Upon intake, screening of lost or stray dogs and cats for identification, including tags, licenses, implanted microchips, and tattoos.
2. A process for matching received lost or stray dogs and cats with any reports of lost pets received by the shelter from owners.
3. Public notice of lost or stray dogs and cats received, provided at the shelter or on the Internet, as appropriate, within 48 hours of the animal’s admission.
4. Reasonable efforts to notify identified owners of lost or stray dogs and cats within 48 hours of identification. Such reasonable efforts may include, but are not limited to, attempts to contact identified owners by telephone, by electronic mail, by United States mail, or by personal service at the owner’s last known phone number and address.
5. Notice to the public of the shelter’s location, hours, fees, and the return-to-owner process posted on the Internet, with the shelter’s business hours posted outside the shelter facility and recorded on the shelter’s telephone answering system message.
6. Access for owners to retrieve dogs and cats at least 1 weekend day per week and after 5:00 p.m. 1 weekday per week, provided that complying with the requirements of this subparagraph does not require an increase in total operating hours.
7. Direct return-to-owner protocols that allow animal control officers in the field to directly return lost or stray dogs and cats to their owners when the owners have been identified.
8. Procedural safeguards to minimize the euthanasia of owned dogs and cats. Such safeguards shall include, but are not limited to, record verification to ensure that each animal to be euthanized is the correct animal designated for the procedure and proper scanning for an implanted microchip using a universal scanner immediately prior to the procedure.
9. Temporary extension of local minimum stray hold periods after a disaster is declared by the President of the United States or a state of emergency is declared by the Governor, if deemed necessary by a local government in the area of the declaration.
(b) Records related to this section and maintained by a public or private animal shelter, humane organization, or animal control agency operated by a humane society or by a county, municipality, or other incorporated political subdivision must be made available to the public pursuant to chapter 119.
History.s. 1, ch. 2018-87.
823.16 Sport shooting ranges; definitions; exemption from liability; exemption from specified rules; exemption from nuisance actions; continued operation.
(1) Definitions.As used in this act, the following terms shall have the following meanings:
(a) “Unit of local government” means a unit of local government created or established by law, including, but not limited to, a city, consolidated government, county, metropolitan government, municipality, town, or village.
(b) “Person” means an individual, corporation, proprietorship, partnership, association, club, two or more persons having a joint or common interest, or any other legal entity.
(c) “Sport shooting range” or “range” means an area designed and operated for the use of rifles, shotguns, pistols, silhouettes, skeet, trap, black powder, or any other similar type of sport shooting.
(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a person who operates or uses a sport shooting range in this state shall not be subject to civil liability or criminal prosecution in any matter relating to noise or noise pollution which results from the operation or use of a sport shooting range, if the range is in compliance with any noise control laws or ordinances adopted by a unit of local government applicable to the range and its operation at the time of construction or initial operation of the range.
(3) A person who operates or uses a sport shooting range is not subject to an action for nuisance, and a court of this state shall not enjoin the use or operation of a sport shooting range on the basis of noise or noise pollution, if the range is in compliance with any noise control laws or ordinances that applied to the range and its operation at the time of construction or initial operation of the range.
(4) Rules adopted by any state department or agency for limiting levels of noise in terms of decibel levels which may occur in the outdoor atmosphere shall not apply to a sport shooting range exempted from liability under this act.
(5) A person who acquires title to or owns real property adversely affected by the use of property with a permanently located and improved sport shooting range shall not maintain a nuisance action against the person who owns the range to restrain, enjoin, or impede the use of the range where there has not been a substantial change in the nature of the use of the range. This section does not prohibit actions for negligence or recklessness in the operation of a sport shooting range or by a person using the range.
(6) A sport shooting range that is not in violation of existing law at the time of the enactment of an ordinance applicable to the sport shooting range shall be permitted to continue in operation even if the operation of the sport shooting range does not conform to the new ordinance or an amendment to an existing ordinance, provided the range was not in violation of any law when the range was constructed and provided that the range continues to conform to current National Rifle Association gun safety and shooting range standards.
(7) Except as otherwise provided in this act, this act shall not prohibit a local government from regulating the location and construction of a sport shooting range after the effective date of this act.
History.s. 1, ch. 99-134.

F.S. 823 on Google Scholar

F.S. 823 on Casetext

Amendments to 823


Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 823
Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

S823.01 - DISTURBING PEACE - PUBLIC NUISANCE - M: S
S823.02 - HEALTH-SAFETY - BUILD BONFIRE WITHIN 10 RODS OF HOUSE OR BLDG - M: S
S823.04 - HEALTH-SAFETY - BRING ANIMALS INTO STATE SUFFERING DISEASE - F: T
S823.041 - HEALTH-SAFETY - UNLAWFUL DISPOSAL OF DEAD ANIMAL - M: S
S823.06 - HEALTH-SAFETY - ILLEGAL OPEN DOOR INWARD - F: T
S823.07 - HEALTH-SAFETY - APPLIANCE W DOOR RESULT INJURY OR DEATH CHILD - F: T
S823.07 - HEALTH-SAFETY - APPLIANCE W DOORS NO INJURY OR DEATH - M: S
S823.10 1 - PUBLIC ORDER CRIMES - KEEP PUB NUISANCE STRUCTURE FOR DRUG ACTIVITY - F: T
S823.11 - HEALTH-SAFETY - RENUMBERED. SEE REC # 8752 - M: F
S823.11 2 - HEALTH-SAFETY - STORE LEAVE ABANDON DERELICT VESSEL - M: F
S823.11 3a - FRAUD - REG AFTER FAIL PAY VESSEL REMOVE DISPOSE - M: F
S823.11 3b - FRAUD - RENUMBERED. SEE REC # 9705 - M: F
S823.12 - HEALTH-SAFETY - SMOKING IN ELEVATOR - M: S
S823.13 1 - PUBLIC ORDER CRIMES - BLDG VES VEH USED VIEW SELL OBSCENE MATERIAL - M: S
S823.13 2 - PUBLIC ORDER CRIMES - DRIVE IN SHOW NUDITY VISIBLE PUB STREET PLACE - M: S
S823.14 4 - HEALTH-SAFETY - FARM CREATE NUISANCE CONDITIONS - M: S
S823.15 - HEALTH-SAFETY - UNCONTROLLED BREEDING CATS DOGS - M: S
S823.16 - PUBLIC ORDER CRIMES - SHOOTING RANGE FAIL TO COMPLY WITH NOISE REGS - M: S



Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases from cite.case.law:

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, v. BOOKING. COM B. V., 140 S. Ct. 2298 (U.S. 2020)

. . . See, e.g. , In re Cordua Restaurants, Inc. , 823 F.3d 594, 599 (CA Fed. 2016) ; Nartron Corp. v. . . .

C. LIU, v. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 140 S. Ct. 1936 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Local 111 , 278 F.2d 823, 825 (CA1 1960) (enforcing a disgorgement order from the agency). . . .

KANSAS v. C. BOETTGER v., 140 S. Ct. 1956 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Chicago , 561 U.S. 742, 823, 130 S.Ct. 3020, 177 L.Ed.2d 894 (2010) (opinion concurring in part and concurring . . .

GEORGIA, v. PUBLIC. RESOURCE. ORG, INC., 140 S. Ct. 1498 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Everett , 326 Ga.App. 6, 755 S.E.2d 823 (2014) ) with Ga. . . .

RAMOS, v. LOUISIANA, 140 S. Ct. 1390 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Louisiana , 555 U.S. 823, 129 S.Ct. 130, 172 L.Ed.2d 37 (2008) ; McIntyre v. . . .

PEARSALL, v. C. GUERNSEY, DDS s, 140 S. Ct. 2706 (U.S. 2020)

. . . No. 19-823. Supreme Court of the United States. April 20, 2020 The petition for rehearing is denied. . . .

K. KAHLER, v. KANSAS, 140 S. Ct. 1021 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Serravo , 823 P.2d 128, 135 (Colo. 1992). . . .

MCKINNEY, v. ARIZONA, 140 S. Ct. 702 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Ryan , 813 F.3d 798, 804, 822-823 (CA9 2015). . . .

C. HERNANDEZ, v. MESA, Jr., 140 S. Ct. 735 (U.S. 2020)

. . . remedy for injuries incurred on foreign soil-counseled against an extension of Bivens . 885 F.3d at 816-823 . . . " for Bivens , the court concluded, and special factors counseled its hesitation. 885 F.3d 811, 816-823 . . .

PEARSALL, v. C. GUERNSEY, DDS., 140 S. Ct. 1120 (U.S. 2020)

. . . No. 19-823 Supreme Court of the United States. . . .

UNITED STATES v. LILLARD,, 935 F.3d 827 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . See In re Castaic Partners II, LLC , 823 F.3d 966, 968-69 (9th Cir. 2016) ("The test for mootness of . . . Castaic Partners II , 823 F.3d at 968. Lillard's appeal is therefore not moot. B. . . .

G. STEPHENS v. UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, a, 935 F.3d 852 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Windley , 144 Idaho 539, 164 P.3d 819, 823 (2007). . . .

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, v. QUALCOMM INCORPORATED, a Oy,, 935 F.3d 752 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Trinko, LLP ("Trinko "), 540 U.S. 398, 408, 124 S.Ct. 872, 157 L.Ed.2d 823 (2004) (second alteration . . .

IN RE BOWLES,, 935 F.3d 1210 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . See In re Thomas, 823 F.3d 1345, 1349 (11th Cir. 2016) (denying application for leave to file a second . . .

IN RE JUAREZ, v., 603 B.R. 610 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Daca-Castaic, LLC (In re Castaic Partners II, LLC) , 823 F.3d 966, 968 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing In re . . .

DIVERSE POWER, INC. v. CITY OF LAGRANGE, GEORGIA,, 934 F.3d 1270 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . City Council of Augusta , 206 Ga. 753, 58 S.E.2d 823, 824-25 (1950) )). . . .

BACA v. COLORADO DEPARTMENT OF STATE, G. T. L. M., 935 F.3d 887 (10th Cir. 2019)

. . . Id. at 823, 117 S.Ct. 2312 ; see also Va. House of Delegates v. . . . Id. at 2665 (alteration in original) (quoting Raines , 521 U.S. at 823, 117 S.Ct. 2312 ). . . . does not go into effect), on the ground that their votes have been completely nullified." 521 U.S. at 823 . . .

BURKE, v. REGALADO, v., 935 F.3d 960 (10th Cir. 2019)

. . . Supp. 2d 823, 846 (N.D. . . .

HARVILLE, v. CITY OF HOUSTON, MISSISSIPPI,, 935 F.3d 404 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . City of Raleigh , 867 F.2d 823, 827 (4th Cir. 1989) ("We are not persuaded that a preference for family . . .

DEJORIA, v. MAGHREB PETROLEUM EXPLORATION, S. A., 935 F.3d 381 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . United States , 823 F.3d 282, 287-88 (5th Cir. 2016) ; United States v. Ellis , 201 F. . . .

UNITED STATES v. CLARK,, 935 F.3d 558 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Lewis , 823 F.3d 1075, 1083 (7th Cir. 2016) (defendant waived challenge to supervised release condition . . .

ROMO, v. P. BARR,, 933 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Lynch , 834 F.3d 823, 830-36 (7th Cir. 2016) (Posner, J., concurring); Ceron v. . . .

GRAHAM v. ST. LOUIS METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT O P. O. K., 933 F.3d 1007 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . City of Baxter, 823 F.3d 441, 445 (8th Cir. 2016) ). . . .

GREYER, v. ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, v., 933 F.3d 871 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . App'x 822, 823 (7th Cir. 2016) ; Thompson v. Taylor , 473 F. . . .

UNITED STATES v. SAINZ,, 933 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Garner , 519 F.App'x 823 (4th Cir. 2013), the Fourth Circuit stated its policy not to sua sponte raise . . .

GREENWICH INSURANCE COMPANY v. CAPSCO INDUSTRIES, INCORPORATED, L. L. C., 934 F.3d 419 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . Williams , 231 Ala. 450, 165 So. 820, 823 (1936) ). . . .

ODDO, v. BIMBO BAKERIES U. S. A. INC., 391 F. Supp. 3d 466 (E.D. Pa. 2019)

. . . Ford Motor Co., 171 F.3d 818, 823 (3d Cir. 1999) )). . . .

KIRSCHENBAUM, v. ASSA CORPORATION, Co., 934 F.3d 191 (2nd Cir. 2019)

. . . Ct. at 823. . . . See id. at 823 ("The issue at hand is whether § 1610(g) ... allows a [terrorism-related] judgment holder . . .

BRENDA L. v. SAUL,, 392 F. Supp. 3d 858 (N.D. Ill. 2019)

. . . Drywall Dynamics, Inc. , 823 F.3d 524, 532 (9th Cir. 2016) ; F.T.C. v. . . .

A. LAVITE, v. J. DUNSTAN,, 932 F.3d 1020 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Wernert , 823 F.3d 902, 910 (7th Cir. 2016). . . .

WINDRIDGE OF NAPERVILLE CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, v. PHILADELPHIA INDEMNITY INSURANCE COMPANY,, 932 F.3d 1035 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Kane County , 823 F.3d 1066, 1070 (7th Cir. 2016). . . . Hartford Insurance Co. of the Midwest , 214 Ill.2d 11, 291 Ill.Dec. 269, 823 N.E.2d 561, 564 (2005) ( . . .

EVANS, v. GRIFFIN,, 932 F.3d 1043 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . commits an error of law or makes a clearly erroneous finding of fact.' " In re Veluchamy , 879 F.3d 808, 823 . . .

O. CAMPOS, v. COOK COUNTY,, 932 F.3d 972 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Jones , 823 F.2d 1068, 1073 (7th Cir. 1987) (explaining that the court improperly dismissed the complaint . . .

HUBBELL, v. FEDEX SMARTPOST, INC., 933 F.3d 558 (6th Cir. 2019)

. . . Sheriff's Dep't , 207 F.3d 818, 823 (6th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). . . .

JONES, v. A. BERRYHILL,, 392 F. Supp. 3d 831 (M.D. Tenn. 2019)

. . . Sec'y of Health & Human Servs. , 823 F.2d 922, 927-28 (6th Cir. 1987) ; Varley , 820 F.2d at 779. . . .

SILVERTOP ASSOCIATES INC. v. KANGAROO MANUFACTURING INC., 931 F.3d 215 (3rd Cir. 2019)

. . . Indus. , 9 F.3d 823, 838 (10th Cir. 1993) ). . . .

ORDUNO, v. PIETRZAK, v., 932 F.3d 710 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Mills, Inc. , 823 F.3d 472, 479-80 (8th Cir. 2016). . . .

IN RE POLLARD,, 931 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . 1319, 1321 (11th Cir. 2018) ; Rogers, 825 F.3d at 1340-41 ; Hires, 825 F.3d at 1303-04 ; In re Thomas, 823 . . .

UNITED STATES v. KRAEMER,, 933 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Bennett , 823 F.3d 1316, 1322 (10th Cir. 2016) ; United States v. . . . Bennett , 823 F.3d at 1322. . . . Bennett , 823 F.3d at 1323. . . . Bennett , 823 F.3d 1316, 1324 n.11 (10th Cir. 2016) ; United States v. . . .

CRYSTALLEX INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION v. BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA De S. A. D. C. In De S. A., 932 F.3d 126 (3rd Cir. 2019)

. . . Ct. 816, 823, --- L.Ed.2d ---- (2018), the Supreme Court all but confirmed that Bancec can indeed be . . . Ct. at 823. . . . Ct. at 823. . . . Id. at 823 (quoting Walter Fuller Aircraft Sales, Inc. , 965 F.2d at 1380 n.7 ). . . .

UNITED STATES v. GALECKI, v., 932 F.3d 176 (4th Cir. 2019)

. . . McFadden , 823 F.3d 217, 223 (4th Cir. 2016). B. . . . See McFadden , 823 F.3d at 223. . . . Act distribution offense requires distribution of a product "for human consumption," see McFadden , 823 . . . McFadden , 823 F.3d at 223 ; see 21 U.S.C. § 802(32)(A). . . .

RUIZ- CORTEZ, v. CITY OF CHICAGO,, 931 F.3d 592 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Dessart , 823 F.3d 395, 404 (7th Cir. 2016). Rule 59 differs from Rule 50. See Mejia v. . . .

STEPP, v. COVANCE CENTRAL LABORATORY SERVICES, INC., 931 F.3d 632 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Kane Cty. , 823 F.3d 1066, 1071 (7th Cir. 2016). . . . See Yahnke , 823 F.3d at 1071 (plaintiff can cast doubt on defendant's explanation with evidence that . . .

UNITED STATES v. SHELDON TREE TOP,, 931 F.3d 720 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Reynolds, 432 F.3d 821, 823 (8th Cir. 2005), and relying on Hughey v. . . .

UNITED STATES v. DOE,, 932 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . Wheeler , 322 F.3d 823, 828 n.1 (5th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) ("Where two previous holdings or lines of . . . Comm'r , 985 F.2d 819, 823 (5th Cir. 1993). . . .

NGUYEN, a v. NISSAN NORTH AMERICA, INC. a, 932 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Common sense indicates that it is[.]" 823 F.3d 977, 987 (11th Cir. 2016) (alteration in original) (quoting . . .

UNITED STATES v. POTTS, 389 F. Supp. 3d 352 (E.D. Pa. 2019)

. . . July 2, 2019 (Document No. 822), and defendant filed a reply, pro se , on July 15, 2019 (Document No. 823 . . . Defendant [sic] Pro Se Motion for a Sentence Reduction Pursuant to the First Step Act of 2018 (Document No. 823 . . .

Z. J. a BY AND THROUGH Je JONES, v. KANSAS CITY BOARD OF POLICE COMMISSIONERS,, 931 F.3d 672 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . City of Baxter , 823 F.3d 441, 445-46 (8th Cir. 2016) ). . . .

ANDERSON, v. CITY OF ROCKFORD,, 932 F.3d 494 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Alderden , 821 F.3d 823, 832 & n.2 (7th Cir. 2016). . . .

STATE BY AND THROUGH TENNESSEE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE,, 931 F.3d 499 (6th Cir. 2019)

. . . Byrd , 521 U.S. 811, 823, 117 S.Ct. 2312, 138 L.Ed.2d 849 (1997) (footnote omitted). . . . (quoting Raines , 521 U.S. at 823-24, 117 S.Ct. 2312 ). . . .

CARVAJAL VASQUEZ, v. GAMBA ACEVEDO,, 931 F.3d 519 (6th Cir. 2019)

. . . R. 38, PID 823. . . .

DJERF, v. L. RYAN,, 931 F.3d 870 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Id. at 823. We conclude here it would not-any error was harmless. . . . McKinney , 813 F.3d at 823. In Poyson v. . . .

IN RE T. HAMMOUD,, 931 F.3d 1032 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . In re Thomas , 823 F.3d 1345, 1348 (11th Cir. 2016). The same rationale applies here. . . .

HARTMAN v. THOMPSON, 931 F.3d 471 (6th Cir. 2019)

. . . Springboro , 477 F.3d at 821 (internal quotation marks omitted); id. at 823-24 (concluding that although . . .

UNITED STATES v. A. GOODRIDGE,, 392 F. Supp. 3d 159 (D. Mass. 2019)

. . . Fields , 823 F.3d 20, 34-35 (1st Cir. 2016) ; United States v. . . . Hudson , 823 F.3d 11, 16-18 (1st Cir. 2016). . . .

FIRST- CLASS MONITORING, LLC, v. UNITED PARCEL SERVICE OF AMERICA, INC., 389 F. Supp. 3d 456 (E.D. Tex. 2019)

. . . Cir. 2016) ; see also In re TLI Commc'ns LLC Patent Litig. , 823 F.3d 607, 613 (Fed. . . . the abstract idea of a solution to the problem in general."); In re TLI Commc'ns LLC Patent Litig. , 823 . . . See In re TLI Commc'ns LLC Patent Litig. , 823 F.3d at 613 ("Here, we find that, like the claims at issue . . . In re TLI Commc'ns LLC Patent Litig. , 823 F.3d at 614 (citing cases). . . . See 823 F.3d at 613-14. . . .

IN RE A. STEWART, P., 603 B.R. 138 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 2019)

. . . [Doc. 466-3, Tr. 823-824]. . . .

IN RE LICKING RIVER MINING, LLC, v. LLC,, 603 B.R. 336 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 2019)

. . . Alleman (In re Davis ), 120 B.R. 823, 825 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990) ). . . .

PHILADELPHIA INDEMNITY INSURANCE COMPANY, v. CHICAGO TRUST COMPANY, THE BABY FOLD,, 930 F.3d 910 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Hartford Insurance Co. , 214 Ill. 2d 11, 27, 291 Ill.Dec. 269, 823 N.E.2d 561 (2005), citing Grinnell . . .

NNEBE, v. DAUS, v., 931 F.3d 66 (2nd Cir. 2019)

. . . Pataki , 823 F.3d 125, 143 (2d Cir. 2016) (noting that "[i]n the procedural due-process context, actual . . .

EBBE, v. CONCORDE INVESTMENT SERVICES, LLC G. M. a k a M., 392 F. Supp. 3d 228 (D. Mass. 2019)

. . . United Steelworkers of Am., 823 F.2d 1289, 1295 (9th Cir. 1987) ). . . .

IN RE GAULSH,, 602 B.R. 849 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2019)

. . . Clare's Hosp. , 67 N.Y.2d 72, 499 N.Y.S.2d 904, 490 N.E.2d 823, 830 (1986) (payment); Wooten v. . . .

M. CROCE, v. NEW YORK TIMES COMPANY Jr., 930 F.3d 787 (6th Cir. 2019)

. . . Lincoln Publ'g (Ohio), Inc. , 114 Ohio App.3d 595, 683 N.E.2d 823, 837-38 (1996) ; Painter , 148 N.E.2d . . .

CAUSE OF ACTION INSTITUTE, v. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE,, 390 F. Supp. 3d 84 (D.D.C. 2019)

. . . CIA , 823 F.3d 655 (D.C. Cir. 2016), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 137 S. . . . Supp. 3d 35 (D.D.C. 2015), aff'd , 823 F.3d 655. . . .

G. BROWN, v. SERENITY C C, INC., 391 F. Supp. 3d 546 (E.D. Va. 2019)

. . . Supp. 2d 816, 817, 823-24 (E.D. Pa. 2006). . . .

COTTO L PEZ, v. UNI N DE TRABAJADORES DE LA INDUSTRIA EL CTRICA Y RIEGO, X, Y, Z A, B, C, 392 F. Supp. 3d 263 (D. P.R. 2019)

. . . Genzyme Corp., 823 F.3d 724, 730 (1st Cir. 2016). . . .

BECHTEL NATIONAL, INC. v. UNITED STATES,, 929 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019)

. . . United States , 823 F.3d 1364, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2016). . . .

ALARM DETECTION SYSTEMS, INCORPORATED, v. ORLAND FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT,, 929 F.3d 865 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Trinko, LLP , 540 U.S. 398, 410, 124 S.Ct. 872, 157 L.Ed.2d 823 (2004). . . .

GREEN, v. KENNEWAY,, 390 F. Supp. 3d 275 (D. Mass. 2019)

. . . Ct. , 850 F.2d 817, 823 (1st Cir. 1988). Thus, I look only to the ALOFAR to determine whether Mr. . . .

A. SEVER, v. CITY OF SALEM,, 390 F. Supp. 3d 299 (D. Mass. 2019)

. . . Genzyme Corp., 823 F.3d 724, 736 (1st Cir. 2016) ("dismissed for lack of Article III standing must operate . . .

S. R. NEHAD K. R. v. N. BROWDER, 929 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . MacPherson , 630 F.3d 805, 823 (9th Cir. 2010). . . .

K. B. BY AND THROUGH QASSIS v. METHODIST HEALTHCARE MEMPHIS HOSPITALS, Le s, 929 F.3d 795 (6th Cir. 2019)

. . . Jacobson , 823 F.3d 872, 879 (6th Cir. 2016). II. Federal courts have limited jurisdiction. . . . Hogan , 823 F.3d at 880 (quoting Peters v. Lincoln Elec. Co. , 285 F.3d 456, 469 (6th Cir. 2002) ). . . . Hogan , 823 F.3d at 880 (holding that a federal court had jurisdiction because plaintiffs challenged . . .

ABC SOILS, INC. v. DRS POWER TECHNOLOGY, INC., 386 F. Supp. 3d 107 (D. Mass. 2019)

. . . Auth., 443 Mass. 697, 701, 823 N.E.2d 1249, 1253 (2005) ; see Sullivan v. Bos. . . .

CARDIONET, LLC, v. SCOTTCARE CORPORATION,, 388 F. Supp. 3d 442 (E.D. Pa. 2019)

. . . Cir. 2016), see also In re TLI Commc'ns LLC Patent Litig. , 823 F.3d 607, 612 (Fed. . . . Cir. 2017) ; see also TLI , 823 F.3d at 611 (concluding that the patent was directed to the abstract . . . Enfish , 822 F.3d at 1335-36, see also In re TLI Commc'ns LLC Patent Litig. , 823 F.3d at 612 ("[A] relevant . . .

UNITED STATES v. CAREY,, 929 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . No. 94-823, at 6 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1685, 1689 ("Subsection (g) ... provided for . . .

H. WILSON, v. SAFELITE GROUP, INC., 930 F.3d 429 (6th Cir. 2019)

. . . Jacobson , 823 F.3d 872, 879 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Davila , 542 U.S. at 209, 124 S.Ct. 2488 ). . . . Shrader , 823 F.3d 1205, 1210 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that "whether the primary purpose of the plan . . .

PHL VARIABLE INSURANCE COMPANY, v. TOWN OF OYSTER BAY,, 929 F.3d 79 (2nd Cir. 2019)

. . . City of Peekskill , 114 A.D.3d 911, 912, 980 N.Y.S.2d 822, 823 (2d Dep't 2014) (" Mans ") ("A municipal . . . reiterated that estoppel is unavailable against a public agency"); Mans , 114 A.D.3d at 912, 980 N.Y.S.2d at 823 . . . Mans , 114 A.D.3d at 912, 980 N.Y.S.2d at 823. . . .

UNITED STATES v. DOBY,, 928 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2019)

. . . Lewis , 823 F.3d 1075, 1081 (7th Cir. 2016) ("The foundation for these limits on appellate review [imposed . . .

BEVAN ASSOCIATES, LP A, INC. W. M. v. YOST, H. M. L., 929 F.3d 366 (6th Cir. 2019)

. . . Federspiel , 823 F.3d 862, 866 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Taft Broad. Co. v. . . .

WHITSERVE LLC, v. DONUTS INC. LLC, v. LLC,, 390 F. Supp. 3d 571 (D. Del. 2019)

. . . In re TLI Commc'ns LLC Patent Litig. , 823 F.3d 607, 612 (Fed. . . . In re TLI Comm'ns LLC Patent Litig. , 823 F.3d at 612. . . . In re TLI Comm'ns LLC Patent Litig. , 823 F.3d at 613 ; Mortg. Grader, Inc. v. . . .

UNITED STATES v. FLORES,, 929 F.3d 443 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Lewis , 823 F.3d 1075, 1081-82 (7th Cir. 2016). . . .

GAMERO, v. P. BARR,, 929 F.3d 464 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Doherty , 502 U.S. 314, 323, 112 S.Ct. 719, 116 L.Ed.2d 823 (1992). . . .

UNITED STATES v. GAWRON,, 929 F.3d 473 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Lewis , 823 F.3d 1075, 1083 (7th Cir. 2016) (finding waiver established when "the judge asked specifically . . . See Lewis , 823 F.3d at 1083 ; Bloch , 825 F.3d at 873-74 ; Gabriel , 831 F.3d at 814. . . .

J. CUNNINGHAM, v. WAWA, INC., 387 F. Supp. 3d 529 (E.D. Pa. 2019)

. . . Benefit Plan, 823 F.3d 948, 964-65 (9th Cir. 2016) (certifying class, despite contention that plan participants . . .

YANBIN YU, v. APPLE INC. Yu, v. Co., 392 F. Supp. 3d 1096 (N.D. Cal. 2019)

. . . conventional activit[ies] previously known to the industry.' " In re TLI Commc'ns LLC Patent Litig. , 823 . . . In re TLI Commc'ns , 823 F.3d at 609 ; see also id. at 612 ("The specification fails to provide any technical . . .

TD BANK N. A. v. W. HILL, II,, 928 F.3d 259 (3rd Cir. 2019)

. . . Federspiel , 823 F.3d 862, 868 (6th Cir. 2016) (appellate court may consider after-acquired evidence . . .

UNITED STATES v. DINKINS,, 928 F.3d 349 (4th Cir. 2019)

. . . Gardner , 823 F.3d 793 (4th Cir. 2016) (holding that North Carolina robbery does not qualify as an ACCA . . . Gardner , 823 F.3d 793, 804 (4th Cir. 2016). . . . this definition does not satisfy the definition of a violent felony under the ACCA's force clause. 823 . . . Gardner , 823 F.3d 793, that decision has been abrogated by Stokeling . 2. . . . Sipes , 233 N.C. 633, 65 S.E.2d 127, 128 (1951) ; see also Gardner , 823 F.3d at 802-03. . . .

ENGINEERING GROUP, LLC, v. MACK INDUSTRIES OF KALAMAZOO, LLC, f k a, 390 F. Supp. 3d 946 (E.D. Wis. 2019)

. . . Co. , 344 Wis. 2d 494, 501, 823 N.W.2d 532 (Wis. Ct. . . . Id. at 503, 823 N.W.2d 532. . . .

BERNARD M. D. v. INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF INDIANA MEDICAL LICENSING BOARD, 392 F. Supp. 3d 935 (S.D. Ind. 2019)

. . . Supp. 3d 807, 823 (W.D. . . .

IN RE PETTERS COMPANY, INC. LLC PC LLC LLC SPF LLC PL LLC MGC PAC LLC A. BMO v. BMO N. A. M I, 603 B.R. 424 (Bankr. Minn. 2019)

. . . Kanios , Case No. 18-cv-823 (SRN/SER), 383 F.Supp.3d 852, 2019 WL 2193163 (D. Minn. May 20, 2019). . . .

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, v. ARCTURUS CORPORATION L. L. C. J. R. Co. L. L. C. AMG L. L. C., 928 F.3d 400 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . Scott , 725 F.2d 995, 998 (5th Cir.), cert. denied , 467 U.S. 1242, 104 S.Ct. 3515, 82 L.Ed.2d 823 (1984 . . .

UNITED STATES v. MAYES,, 928 F.3d 502 (6th Cir. 2019)

. . . Id. at 823, 131 S.Ct. 2218. . . .

FEDERATED MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. FEDNAT HOLDING COMPANY, 928 F.3d 718 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . See id. at 823-24. . . .

IN RE PETTERS COMPANY, INC. LLC PC LLC LLC SPF LLC PL LLC MGC PAC LLC A. PCI PCI v., 603 B.R. 601 (Bankr. Minn. 2019)

. . . Kanios , Case No. 18-cv-823 (SRN/SER), 2019 WL 2193163 (D. Minn. May 20, 2019). . . .

L. J. BY N. N. J. N. N. J. v. SCHOOL BOARD OF BROWARD COUNTY,, 927 F.3d 1203 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . materially failed to implement IEP which called for 15 hours a week of such therapy); Van Duyn , 502 F.3d at 823 . . .

J. K. J. M. J. J. v. POLK COUNTY L., 928 F.3d 576 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Canton , 489 U.S. at 392, 109 S.Ct. 1197 (citing Tuttle , 471 U.S. at 823, 105 S.Ct. 2427 (plurality . . .

UNITED STATES v. WASHINGTON, S S, 928 F.3d 783 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n , 443 U.S. 658, 666, 99 S.Ct. 3055, 61 L.Ed.2d 823 . . . Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n , 443 U.S. 658, 686, 99 S.Ct. 3055, 61 L.Ed.2d 823 . . .

EDWARDS, v. STATE, 274 So. 3d 1222 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS In Kelly, 77 So. 3d at 823, the appellate court held that the defendant had no . . .

CELLSPIN SOFT, INC. v. FITBIT, INC. USA, U. S. A. JK v. U. S. A., 927 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2019)

. . . Analogizing to In re TLI Communications LLC Patent Litigation , 823 F.3d 607 (Fed. . . . (quoting TLI , 823 F.3d at 615 ). . . . certain results" fall into "a familiar class of claims 'directed to' a patent-ineligible concept"); TLI , 823 . . .

ROSENBERG, v. C. R. BARD, INC., 387 F. Supp. 3d 572 (E.D. Pa. 2019)

. . . Johnson & Johnson, Inc., 615 Pa. 99, 41 A.3d 823, 824-25 (2012). . . .