871.01 Disturbing schools and religious and other assemblies.
871.015 Unlawful protests.
871.02 Indictments or informations for disturbing assembly.
871.04 Advertising; religious discrimination; public places.
871.01 Disturbing schools and religious and other assemblies.—
(1) Whoever willfully interrupts or disturbs any school or any assembly of people met for the worship of God or for any lawful purpose commits a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
(2) Whoever willfully interrupts or disturbs any assembly of people met for the purpose of acknowledging the death of an individual with a military funeral honors detail pursuant to 10 U.S.C. s. 1491 commits a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
History.—ss. 19, 21, 22, ch. 1637, 1868; RS 2627, 2629, 2630; GS 3547; s. 1, ch. 5719, 1907; RGS 5448; CGL 7591; s. 1130, ch. 71-136; s. 1, ch. 2006-264.
871.015 Unlawful protests.—
(1) As used in this section, the term:
(a) “Funeral or burial” means a service or ceremony offered or provided in connection with the final disposition, memorialization, interment, entombment, or inurnment of human remains or cremated human remains.
(b) “Funeral procession” has the same meaning as provided in s. 316.1974.
(c) “Protest activities” means any action, including picketing, which is undertaken with the intent to interrupt or disturb a funeral or burial.
(2) A person may not knowingly engage in protest activities or knowingly cause protest activities to occur within 500 feet of the property line of a residence, cemetery, funeral home, house of worship, or other location during or within 1 hour before or 1 hour after the conducting of a funeral or burial at that place. This subsection does not prohibit protest activities that occur adjacent to that portion of a funeral procession which extends beyond 500 feet of the property line of the location of the funeral or burial.
(3) A person who violates this section commits a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
History.—s. 1, ch. 2013-19; s. 166, ch. 2014-17.
871.02 Indictments or informations for disturbing assembly.—The several grand juries of this state in their respective counties may return indictments or the several state attorneys of the state in their respective circuits may file information against all persons violating s. 871.01, and such indictments or informations, when filed with the clerk of the circuit court in the county where such offense is alleged to have been committed, shall be forthwith certified by the clerk to some court in the county having jurisdiction to try and determine such charge, and said court to which such indictment or information is certified shall proceed to try and determine such charge upon such indictment or information, the same as if affidavit had been made before such court charging the said offense.
History.—ss. 2, 3, ch. 5719, 1907; RGS 5449; CGL 7592; s. 1404, ch. 97-102; s. 2, ch. 2006-264.
871.04 Advertising; religious discrimination; public places.—
(1) Except where the context clearly requires a different meaning, the following terms shall have for the purposes of this section the meaning respectively ascribed to them:
(a) “Person” means any individual, partnership, association, corporation, or organized group of persons, whether incorporated or not.
(b) “Establishment” means any building or part thereof, including, without being limited to, public inns, hotels, motels, apartment hotels, any structure, enclosure, tract of land, and all improvements, appurtenances, and additions, bodies of water whether natural or artificial, and any other place of whatsoever nature to which the general public is or will be admitted, allowed, or invited on payment of a fee, free of charge, or otherwise.
(2) No person, directly or indirectly, for herself or himself or for another, shall publish, post, broadcast by any means, maintain, circularize, issue, display, transmit, or otherwise disseminate or place in any manner before the public with reference to an establishment any advertisement that the patronage of any person is not welcome, or is objectionable, or is not acceptable because of the person’s religion. No person shall cause or solicit another person to violate this section.
(3) This section shall not apply to any establishment which is private or limited to membership only, to any camp administered by any religious organization, group, or sect, admission to which is based on religious belief or affiliation, or to any gathering, meeting, or assembly held under the auspices of any religious organization, group, or sect.
(4) Any person or persons violating this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
History.—ss. 1, 2, ch. 29845, 1955; s. 1132, ch. 71-136; s. 1406, ch. 97-102.
Statutes updated from Official Statutes on: January 26, 2022
422 U.S. 35 (1975) Cited 515 times 1 Legal Analyses
Under the narrower construction of § 871, the jury in this case might well have acquitted, concluding that it was unlikely that Rogers actually intended or expected that his listeners would take his threat as a serious one. Because I think that the District Court's misconstruction of the statute prejudiced petitioner in this case and may continue to do mischief in future prosecutions brought under § 871, I would reverse on this ground rather than on the Solicitor General's confession of error.
"The appealable final judgment in a criminal case is ordinarily the imposition of sentence." State v. Seravalli, supra, 205; State v. Grotton, 180 Conn. 290, 293, 429 A.2d 871 (1980). In both criminal and civil cases, however, we have determined certain interlocutory orders and rulings of the Superior Court to be final judgments for purposes of appeal. An otherwise interlocutory order is appealable in two circumstances: (1) where the order or action terminates a separate and distinct proceeding, or (2) where the order or action so concludes the rights of the parties that further proceedings cannot affect them. State v. Bell, 179 Conn. 98, 99, 425 A.2d 574 (1979). The trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to quash the ordering of the second grand jury, measured against these tests, is not a final judgment within the meaning of 52-263 and 51-197a.
An affidavit cannot be conclusory, see, e.g., Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n , 497 U.S. 871, 888, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990), but nothing in Rule 56 (or, for that matter, in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure) prohibits an affidavit from being self-serving. Indeed, as the Seventh Circuit observed, "most affidavits submitted [in response to a summary judgment motion] are self-serving." Payne v. Pauley , 337 F.3d 767, 772 (7th Cir. 2003). Not surprisingly, most of our cases correctly explain that a litigant's self-serving statements based on personal knowledge or observation can defeat summary judgment. See, e.g., Feliciano v. City of Miami Beach , 707 F.3d 1244, 1253 (11th Cir. 2013) ("To be sure, Feliciano's sworn statements are self-serving, but that alone does not permit us to disregard them at the summary judgment stage."); Price v. Time, Inc. , 416 F.3d 1327, 1345 (11th Cir.) ("Courts routinely and properly deny summary judgment on the basis of a party's sworn testimony even though it is self-serving."), modified on other grounds on denial of reh'g , 425 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 2005).
Accordingly, we conclude that under section 871 a magistrate may dismiss or strike a special circumstance allegation if the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing does not provide sufficient cause to support the allegation. In light of the direct reference to section 871 in section 1387, we also conclude that a dismissal of a special circumstance allegation under section 871 is "an order terminating an action" under section 1387.
At the time Congress enacted § 879, the interpretation of the phrase "knowingly and willfully" in § 871 that had been articulated in Roy and its progeny was widely accepted in the federal courts. The fact that Congress chose to adopt this and other substantially identical language in enacting § 879, which addresses a concern parallel to that engaged by § 871, bespeaks an intention to import the established general intent interpretation of § 871 into the new statute. Cf. Bonanno, 879 F.2d at 21-27 (holding that United States cannot sue for treble damages under RICO, reasoning that it could not do so under similar language of Clayton Act on which RICO was modelled). We accordingly conclude that § 879 requires proof only of general intent.
The purpose of requiring the defendant's presence at sentencing and of pronouncing the sentence in open court is to insure the defendant is apprised of the punishment imposed, See C.Cr.P. arts. 835, 871 and comments thereunder. Accordingly, the failure of the trial judge to fully articulate the sentence and the failure of clerk to accurately reflect what was stated operate to the detriment of the accused.
Stevenson did not cite a single case in his brief which would support his arguments, and his arguments fail on their own. First of all, it is certainly reasonable to believe that a person who received a letter such as that which was sent to Gormley would be frightened and intimidated from performing his or her tasks, and that such fear and intimidation would be the goal of the person who wrote the letter. Under 18 U.S.C. §(s) 115(a)(1)(B), the key point is whether the defendant intentionally communicated the threat. The Ninth Circuit has stated that the "only intent requirement is that the defendant intentionally or knowingly communicates his threat, not that he intended or was able to carry out his threat." United States v. Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d 1262, 1265 (9th Cir. 1990); see also United States v. Roberts, 915 F.2d 889, 890 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1122 (1991). This Circuit stated a similar standard regarding intent in the context of 18 U.S.C. §(s) 871, criminalizing threats to the President. United States v. Pilkington, 583 F.2d 746, 747 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 948 (1979)
The Court, however, takes a directly contrary approach here. Today's decision rests critically on the proposition that respondent's ineffective-assistance claim is to be judged under the law as it exists today, rather than the law as it existed at the time of trial and sentencing. Ante, at 372. In other words, respondent must make his case under Perry v. Lockhart, 871 F.2d 1384 (CA8), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 959 (1989), decided four years after his sentencing; unlike the State, he is not entitled to rely on "then-existing constitutional standards," Teague, 489 U.S., at 310, which rendered him ineligible for the death penalty at the time that sentence was imposed.
The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing these elements. See FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990); Warth, supra, at 508. Since they are not mere pleading requirements, but rather an indispensable part of the plaintiff's case, each element must be supported in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation. See Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 883-889 (1990); Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 114-115, and n. 31 (1979); Simon, supra, at 45, n. 25; Warth, supra, at 527, and n. 6 (Brennan, J., dissenting). At the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant's conduct may suffice, for on a motion to dismiss, we "presum[e] that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim." National Wildlife Federation, supra, at 889. In response to a summary judgment motion, however, the plaintiff can no longer rest on such "mere allegations," but must "set forth" by affidavit or other evidence…