Home
Menu
Call attorney Graham Syfert at 904-383-7448
Personal Injury Lawyer
Florida Statute 924 | Lawyer Caselaw & Research
F.S. 924 Case Law from Google Scholar
Statute is currently reporting as:
Link to State of Florida Official Statute Google Search for Amendments to 924

The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)

Title XLVII
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND CORRECTIONS
Chapter 924
CRIMINAL APPEALS AND COLLATERAL REVIEW
View Entire Chapter
CHAPTER 924
CHAPTER 924
CRIMINAL APPEALS AND COLLATERAL REVIEW
924.02 Who may appeal.
924.04 Appeal by one of several defendants.
924.05 Appeal as matter of right.
924.051 Terms and conditions of appeals and collateral review in criminal cases.
924.055 Postconviction review in capital cases; legislative findings and intent.
924.056 Capital postconviction proceedings; reporting requirements.
924.057 Capital postconviction proceedings; legislative intent.
924.06 Appeal by defendant.
924.065 Denial of motion for new trial or arrest of judgment; appeal bond; supersedeas.
924.066 Collateral relief.
924.07 Appeal by state.
924.071 Additional grounds for appeal by the state; time for taking; stay of cause.
924.09 When appeal to be taken by defendant.
924.14 Stay of execution when defendant appeals.
924.15 Approval of appeal bonds.
924.16 Discharge pending appeal.
924.17 Costs when appellant is indigent.
924.18 Bail when state appeals.
924.19 When operation of order in favor of defendant not stayed.
924.20 Duty of court upon breach of undertaking.
924.22 Stay when execution of sentence already commenced.
924.28 Failure of clerk to transmit appeal papers as required.
924.31 When argument necessary.
924.33 When judgment not to be reversed or modified.
924.34 When evidence sustains only conviction of lesser offense.
924.35 Enforcement of judgment on affirmance.
924.37 Order or decision when state appeals.
924.38 When removal shall be allowed on new trial.
924.02 Who may appeal.The defendant or the state may appeal in criminal cases.
History.s. 281, ch. 19554, 1939; CGL 1940 Supp. 8663(291); s. 143, ch. 70-339.
924.04 Appeal by one of several defendants.One or more defendants who are tried jointly may appeal, but those who do not join shall not be affected by the appeal except by express provision of the appellate court.
History.s. 283, ch. 19554, 1939; CGL 1940 Supp. 8663(293); s. 145, ch. 70-339.
924.05 Appeal as matter of right.Direct appeals provided for in this chapter are a matter of right.
History.s. 284, ch. 19554, 1939; CGL 1940 Supp. 8663(294); s. 146, ch. 70-339; s. 3, ch. 96-248.
924.051 Terms and conditions of appeals and collateral review in criminal cases.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) “Prejudicial error” means an error in the trial court that harmfully affected the judgment or sentence.
(b) “Preserved” means that an issue, legal argument, or objection to evidence was timely raised before, and ruled on by, the trial court, and that the issue, legal argument, or objection to evidence was sufficiently precise that it fairly apprised the trial court of the relief sought and the grounds therefor.
(2) The right to direct appeal and the provisions for collateral review created in this chapter may only be implemented in strict accordance with the terms and conditions of this section.
(3) An appeal may not be taken from a judgment or order of a trial court unless a prejudicial error is alleged and is properly preserved or, if not properly preserved, would constitute fundamental error. A judgment or sentence may be reversed on appeal only when an appellate court determines after a review of the complete record that prejudicial error occurred and was properly preserved in the trial court or, if not properly preserved, would constitute fundamental error.
(4) If a defendant pleads nolo contendere without expressly reserving the right to appeal a legally dispositive issue, or if a defendant pleads guilty without expressly reserving the right to appeal a legally dispositive issue, the defendant may not appeal the judgment or sentence.
(5) Collateral relief is not available on grounds that were or could have been raised at trial and, if properly preserved, on direct appeal of the conviction and sentence.
(6) In a noncapital case, a petition or motion for collateral or other postconviction relief may not be considered if it is filed more than 2 years after the judgment and sentence became final, unless the petition or motion alleges that:
(a) The facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner or his or her attorney and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence;
(b) The fundamental constitutional right asserted was not established within the period provided for in this subsection and has been held to apply retroactively; or
(c) The sentence imposed was illegal because it either exceeded the maximum or fell below the minimum authorized by statute for the criminal offense at issue. Either the state or the defendant may petition the trial court to vacate an illegal sentence at any time.
(7) In a direct appeal or a collateral proceeding, the party challenging the judgment or order of the trial court has the burden of demonstrating that a prejudicial error occurred in the trial court. A conviction or sentence may not be reversed absent an express finding that a prejudicial error occurred in the trial court.
(8) It is the intent of the Legislature that all terms and conditions of direct appeal and collateral review be strictly enforced, including the application of procedural bars, to ensure that all claims of error are raised and resolved at the first opportunity. It is also the Legislature’s intent that all procedural bars to direct appeal and collateral review be fully enforced by the courts of this state.
(9) Funds, resources, or employees of this state or its political subdivisions may not be used, directly or indirectly, in appellate or collateral proceedings unless the use is constitutionally or statutorily mandated.
History.s. 4, ch. 96-248; s. 1842, ch. 97-102; s. 11, ch. 97-313; s. 19, ch. 2000-3.
924.055 Postconviction review in capital cases; legislative findings and intent.It is the intent of the Legislature to reduce delays in capital cases and to ensure that all appeals and postconviction actions in capital cases are resolved as soon as possible after the date a sentence of death is imposed in the circuit court. A person sentenced to death or that person’s capital postconviction counsel must file any postconviction legal action in compliance with the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure.
History.s. 8, ch. 96-290; s. 5, ch. 2000-3; s. 13, ch. 2013-216.
924.056 Capital postconviction proceedings; reporting requirements.
(1) The Supreme Court shall annually report to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate the status of each capital case in which a postconviction action has been filed that has been continuously pending for more than 3 years. The report must include the name of the state court judge involved in the case.
(2) In a capital postconviction proceeding in which it has been determined that an attorney of record provided constitutionally deficient representation and relief has been granted as a result of such determination, after the highest court having jurisdiction to review such determination has issued its final order affirming the determination, the court making such determination shall furnish a copy of the findings to The Florida Bar for appropriate disciplinary action.
History.s. 6, ch. 2000-3; s. 14, ch. 2013-216.
924.057 Capital postconviction proceedings; legislative intent.The Legislature acknowledges the efforts made by the judicial branch in establishing the rules of criminal procedure that make the capital postconviction process fair and more efficient. The Legislature also recognizes and commends the judicial branch for continuing these efforts by issuing Administrative Order AOSC13-11, which creates a Capital Postconviction Proceedings Subcommittee of the Criminal Court Steering Committee, and directs the subcommittee to undertake a comprehensive review of capital postconviction proceedings, and to make recommendations to the Supreme Court whether court rules should be amended to improve the overall efficiency of the capital postconviction process. In support of these efforts, the Legislature expresses its intent that capital postconviction proceedings be conducted in accordance with court rules, and that courts strictly adhere to the timeframes and postconviction motion content requirements established therein.
History.s. 7, ch. 2000-3; s. 15, ch. 2013-216.
924.06 Appeal by defendant.
(1) A defendant may appeal from:
(a) A final judgment of conviction when probation has not been granted under chapter 948, except as provided in subsection (3);
(b) An order granting probation under chapter 948;
(c) An order revoking probation under chapter 948;
(d) A sentence, on the ground that it is illegal; or
(e) A sentence imposed under s. 921.0024 of the Criminal Punishment Code which exceeds the statutory maximum penalty provided in s. 775.082 for an offense at conviction, or the consecutive statutory maximums for offenses at conviction, unless otherwise provided by law.
(2) An appeal of an order granting probation shall proceed in the same manner and have the same effect as an appeal of a judgment of conviction. An appeal of an order revoking probation may review only proceedings after the order of probation. If a judgment of conviction preceded an order of probation, the defendant may appeal from the order or the judgment or both.
(3) A defendant who pleads guilty with no express reservation of the right to appeal a legally dispositive issue, or a defendant who pleads nolo contendere with no express reservation of the right to appeal a legally dispositive issue, shall have no right to a direct appeal.
History.s. 285, ch. 19554, 1939; CGL 1940 Supp. 8663(295); s. 22, ch. 20519, 1941; s. 3, ch. 59-130; s. 147, ch. 70-339; s. 7, ch. 76-274; s. 3, ch. 83-87; s. 6, ch. 93-406; s. 5, ch. 96-248; s. 27, ch. 97-194; s. 13, ch. 98-204.
924.065 Denial of motion for new trial or arrest of judgment; appeal bond; supersedeas.
(1) Immediately after denial of a motion for a new trial or a motion in arrest of judgment, the court shall dictate the denial to the court reporter and sentence the defendant. The defendant may file notice of appeal following denial of the motion and sentencing. Upon filing of notice of appeal, the court shall set the amount of the appeal bond if the defendant is entitled to bail. The clerk shall prepare a certificate setting forth the filing and approval of the supersedeas bond, and the certificate shall be sufficient authority for release of the defendant.
(2) An appeal may not be a supersedeas to the execution of the judgment, sentence, or order until the appellant has entered into a bond with at least two sureties to secure the payment of the judgment, fine, and any future costs that may be adjudged by the appellate court. The bond shall be conditioned on the appellant’s personally answering and abiding by the final order, sentence, or judgment of the appellate court and, if the action is remanded, on the appellant’s appearing before the court in which the case was originally determined and not departing without leave of court.
(3) An appellant who has been sentenced to death shall not be released on bail.
History.s. 239, ch. 19554, 1939; CGL 1940 Supp. 8663(248); s. 120, ch. 70-339; s. 23, ch. 2013-25.
Note.Former s. 920.02.
924.066 Collateral relief.
(1) Subject to the terms and conditions set forth in this chapter, a prisoner in custody may seek relief based upon claims that the judgment of conviction or sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or law of the United States or the State of Florida.
(2) Either the state or a prisoner in custody may obtain review in the next higher state court of a trial court’s adverse ruling granting or denying collateral relief. The state may obtain review of any trial court ruling that fails to enforce a procedural bar.
(3) A person in a noncapital case who is seeking collateral review under this chapter has no right to a court-appointed lawyer.
History.s. 6, ch. 96-248.
924.07 Appeal by state.
(1) The state may appeal from:
(a) An order dismissing an indictment or information or any count thereof or dismissing an affidavit charging the commission of a criminal offense, the violation of probation, the violation of community control, or the violation of any supervised correctional release.
(b) An order granting a new trial.
(c) An order arresting judgment.
(d) A ruling on a question of law when the defendant is convicted and appeals from the judgment. Once the state’s cross-appeal is instituted, the appellate court shall review and rule upon the question raised by the state regardless of the disposition of the defendant’s appeal.
(e) The sentence, on the ground that it is illegal.
(f) A judgment discharging a prisoner on habeas corpus.
(g) An order adjudicating a defendant insane under the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure.
(h) All other pretrial orders, except that it may not take more than one appeal under this subsection in any case.
(i) A sentence imposed below the lowest permissible sentence established by the Criminal Punishment Code under chapter 921.
(j) A ruling granting a motion for judgment of acquittal after a jury verdict.
(k) An order denying restitution under s. 775.089.
(l) An order or ruling suppressing evidence or evidence in limine at trial.
(m) An order withholding adjudication of guilt in violation of s. 775.08435.
(n) The sentence in a case of capital sexual battery on the ground that it resulted from the circuit court’s failure to comply with sentencing procedures under s. 921.1425, including by striking a notice of intent to seek the death penalty, refusing to impanel a capital jury, or otherwise granting relief that prevents the state from seeking a sentence of death.
(2) An appeal under this section must embody all assignments of error in each pretrial order that the state seeks to have reviewed. The state shall pay all costs of the appeal except for the defendant’s attorney’s fee.
History.s. 286, ch. 19554, 1939; CGL 1940 Supp. 8663(296); s. 1, ch. 69-15; s. 148, ch. 70-339; s. 4, ch. 83-87; s. 46, ch. 87-243; s. 1, ch. 90-239; s. 14, ch. 93-37; s. 7, ch. 93-406; s. 7, ch. 96-248; s. 28, ch. 97-194; s. 14, ch. 98-204; s. 2, ch. 2004-60; s. 5, ch. 2023-25.
924.071 Additional grounds for appeal by the state; time for taking; stay of cause.
(1) The state may appeal from a pretrial order dismissing a search warrant or suppressing evidence, however obtained, or which directly and expressly conflicts with an appellate decision of a district court of appeal or of the Florida Supreme Court. The appeal must be taken before the trial.
(2) An appeal by the state from a pretrial order shall stay the case against each defendant upon whose application the order was made until the appeal is determined. If the trial court determines that the evidence, confession, or admission that is the subject of the order would materially assist the state in proving its case against another defendant and that the prosecuting attorney intends to use it for that purpose, the court shall stay the case of that defendant until the appeal is determined. A defendant in custody whose case is stayed either automatically or by order of the court shall be released on his or her own recognizance pending the appeal if he or she is charged with a bailable offense.
History.ss. 1, 2, ch. 67-123; s. 1, ch. 69-267; s. 149, ch. 70-339; s. 2, ch. 90-239; s. 1554, ch. 97-102.
924.09 When appeal to be taken by defendant.An appeal may be taken by the defendant only within the time provided by the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure after the judgment, sentence, or order appealed from is entered, except that an appeal by a person who has not been granted probation may be taken from both judgment and sentence within the time provided by said rules after the sentence is entered.
History.s. 288, ch. 19554, 1939; CGL 1940 Supp. 8663(298); s. 4, ch. 59-130; s. 1, ch. 69-267.
924.14 Stay of execution when defendant appeals.An appeal by a defendant from either the judgment or sentence shall stay execution of the sentence, subject to the provisions of s. 924.065.
History.s. 293a, ch. 19554, 1939; CGL 1940 Supp. 8663(303); s. 151, ch. 70-339.
924.15 Approval of appeal bonds.Appeal bonds shall be approved by the court which originally determined the action and shall be filed with the clerk of that court.
History.s. 293b, ch. 19554, 1939; CGL 1940 Supp. 8663(304); s. 152, ch. 70-339.
924.16 Discharge pending appeal.If a defendant is in custody after judgment of conviction at the time of appeal, the appeal and supersedeas shall not discharge the defendant from custody. The court appealed from or a judge of the appellate court may order the defendant released on bail in cases that are bailable.
History.s. 293c, ch. 19554, 1939; CGL 1940 Supp. 8663(305); s. 153, ch. 70-339; s. 1555, ch. 97-102.
924.17 Costs when appellant is indigent.If the court determines that the defendant is indigent and unable to pay costs, the appeal shall be a supersedeas without payment of costs.
History.s. 293d, ch. 19554, 1939; CGL 1940 Supp. 8663(306); s. 1, ch. 28009, 1953; s. 154, ch. 70-339.
924.18 Bail when state appeals.If the state appeals after a conviction of the defendant, a justice or judge of the appellate or trial court may in his or her discretion admit the defendant to bail.
History.s. 294, ch. 19554, 1939; CGL 1940 Supp. 8663(307); s. 155, ch. 70-339; s. 1556, ch. 97-102.
924.19 When operation of order in favor of defendant not stayed.An appeal by the state shall not stay the operation of an order in favor of the defendant except as provided in s. 924.071(2), or when the appeal is from an order granting a new trial.
History.s. 295, ch. 19554, 1939; CGL 1940 Supp. 8663(308); s. 155, ch. 70-339.
924.20 Duty of court upon breach of undertaking.When an appellant at liberty on bail fails to prosecute the appeal as required by the undertaking, the appellate court, in addition to declaring the bond forfeited, may dismiss the appeal and remand the case for further proceedings.
History.s. 296, ch. 19554, 1939; CGL 1940 Supp. 8663(309); s. 156, ch. 70-339.
924.22 Stay when execution of sentence already commenced.A defendant who is in custody and has started serving a sentence before an appeal may elect to continue to serve the sentence during the pendency of the appeal even though the defendant may be eligible for bail.
History.s. 298, ch. 19554, 1939; CGL 1940 Supp. 8663(311); s. 157, ch. 70-339; s. 1557, ch. 97-102.
924.28 Failure of clerk to transmit appeal papers as required.Failure of the clerk to transmit appeal papers within the time provided shall not prejudice the rights of the parties. The appellate court or trial court may direct the clerk to transmit the papers on its own motion and shall do so on the motion of either party.
History.s. 304, ch. 19554, 1939; CGL 1940 Supp. 8663(317); s. 158, ch. 70-339.
924.31 When argument necessary.A judgment may be affirmed if the appellant fails to argue, but it shall not be reversed unless the appellant submits a written brief or makes oral argument.
History.s. 307, ch. 19554, 1939; CGL 1940 Supp. 8663(320); s. 159, ch. 70-339.
924.33 When judgment not to be reversed or modified.No judgment shall be reversed unless the appellate court is of the opinion, after an examination of all the appeal papers, that error was committed that injuriously affected the substantial rights of the appellant. It shall not be presumed that error injuriously affected the substantial rights of the appellant.
History.s. 309, ch. 19554, 1939; CGL 1940 Supp. 8663(322); s. 160, ch. 70-339.
924.34 When evidence sustains only conviction of lesser offense.When the appellate court determines that the evidence does not prove the offense for which the defendant was found guilty but does establish guilt of a lesser statutory degree of the offense or a lesser offense necessarily included in the offense charged, the appellate court shall reverse the judgment and direct the trial court to enter judgment for the lesser degree of the offense or for the lesser included offense.
History.s. 310, ch. 19554, 1939; CGL 1940 Supp. 8663(323); s. 161, ch. 70-339; s. 1558, ch. 97-102.
924.35 Enforcement of judgment on affirmance.When the judgment against the defendant is affirmed, the judgment shall be enforced by the trial court.
History.s. 311, ch. 19554, 1939; CGL 1940 Supp. 8663(324); s. 162, ch. 70-339.
924.37 Order or decision when state appeals.
(1) When the state appeals from an order dismissing an indictment, information, or affidavit, or a count of it, or an order granting a new trial and the order is affirmed, the appellate court shall direct the trial court to implement the order. If an order dismissing an indictment, information, or affidavit, or a count of it, is reversed, the appellate court shall direct the trial court to permit the defendant to be tried on the reinstated indictment, information, or affidavit. If an order granting a new trial is reversed, the appellate court shall direct that judgment of conviction be entered against the defendant.
(2) A cross-appeal by the state is not jurisdictional. When the state cross-appeals from a ruling on a question of law adverse to the state, the appellate court shall decide the question if it is reasonably capable of repetition in any proceeding.
History.s. 313, ch. 19554, 1939; CGL 1940 Supp. 8663(326); s. 163, ch. 70-339; s. 8, ch. 96-248.
924.38 When removal shall be allowed on new trial.When the appellate court orders a new trial, it shall be held in the court from which the appeal was taken unless the appellate court determines that the trial court improperly denied the defendant’s application for removal of the original trial. If the appellate court determines that removal is proper, it shall designate the court for the new trial.
History.s. 314, ch. 19554, 1939; CGL 1940 Supp. 8663(327); s. 164, ch. 70-339.

F.S. 924 on Google Scholar

F.S. 924 on Casetext

Amendments to 924


Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 924
Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 924.



Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases from cite.case.law:

JUNE MEDICAL SERVICES L. L. C. v. RUSSO, v. LLC., 140 S. Ct. 2103 (U.S. 2020)

. . . . ----, ---- - ----, 138 S.Ct. 2448, 201 L.Ed.2d 924 (2018) (slip op., at 33-47). . . . S. ----, ----, 138 S.Ct. 2448, 201 L.Ed.2d 924 (2018) (slip op., at 43); United States v. . . . . ----, ---- - ----, 138 S.Ct. 2448, 201 L.Ed.2d 924 (2018) (slip op., at 34-35). . . .

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, v. REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, J. v., 140 S. Ct. 1891 (U.S. 2020)

. . . United States Dept. of Homeland Security , 924 F.3d 684 (2019), cert. pending, No. 18-1469. . . . United States Dept. of Homeland Security , 924 F.3d 684, 709-715 (CA4 2019) (Richardson, J., concurring . . .

ST. HUBERT v. UNITED STATES, 140 S. Ct. 1727 (U.S. 2020)

. . . . § 924(c). . . . Under § 924(c), St. . . . Hubert argued that his Hobbs Act crimes were not "crime[s] of violence" under § 924(c). . . . The Court of Appeals held both that the residual clause, § 924(c)(3)(B), was not void for vagueness-a . . . Hubert's Hobbs Act crimes constituted crimes of violence under the elements clause, § 924(c)(3)(A). . . .

JARCHOW, v. STATE BAR OF WISCONSIN,, 140 S. Ct. 1720 (U.S. 2020)

. . . . ----, 138 S.Ct. 2448, 201 L.Ed.2d 924 (2018). . . .

RAMOS, v. LOUISIANA, 140 S. Ct. 1390 (U.S. 2020)

. . . . ----, 138 S.Ct. 2448, 201 L.Ed.2d 924 (2018) ; id ., at ----, 138 S.Ct., at 2499 (KAGAN, J., dissenting . . . S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 2448, 201 L.Ed.2d 924 (2018) ; Hurst v. Florida , 577 U. . . . S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 2448, 201 L.Ed.2d 924 (2018), where we overruled Abood v. . . .

K. KAHLER, v. KANSAS, 140 S. Ct. 1021 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Rep. 924, 925 (N. . . . Rep. 924 (N. . . .

DAVIS v. UNITED STATES, 140 S. Ct. 1060 (U.S. 2020)

. . . . §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2), and for possessing drugs with the intent to distribute them, 21 U.S.C. §§ . . .

GUEDES, v. BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES,, 140 S. Ct. 789 (U.S. 2020)

. . . . § 924(a)(2). . . .

SHULAR, v. UNITED STATES, 140 S. Ct. 779 (U.S. 2020)

. . . III A The parties here agree that § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) requires a categorical approach. . . . They differ, however, on what comparison § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) requires. . . . 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), show that § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) refers to conduct. . . . Contrast § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) with § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), the enumerated-offense clause of ACCA's "violent . . . See § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (crime that "is burglary, arson, or extortion"). . . .

UNITED STATES v. BLOCK, 935 F.3d 655 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . . § 924(e)(1) (applying to felons-in-possession with "three previous convictions ... for a violent felony . . . . § 4B1.2(a)(1), which has a definition that is "nearly identical" to "violent felony," 18 U.S.C. § 924 . . . His Texas drug convictions also qualify as "serious drug offenses." 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). . . . Id. at 886 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) (defining . . .

ELHADY, v. H. KABLE,, 391 F. Supp. 3d 562 (E.D. Va. 2019)

. . . Homar , 520 U.S. 924, 930, 117 S.Ct. 1807, 138 L.Ed.2d 120 (1997) ("[O]n many occasions, [ ] where a . . .

UNITED STATES v. B. LOWRY,, 935 F.3d 638 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . . §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). . . . was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924 . . .

REYNA, v. P. BARR,, 935 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Barr , 924 F.3d 983, 986 (8th Cir. 2019), and Reyna's preliminary contention is foreclosed by that decision . . .

L. SMITH, v. SHARP,, 935 F.3d 1064 (10th Cir. 2019)

. . . Mullin, 379 F.3d at 924. . . .

CHACHANKO, v. UNITED STATES, 935 F.3d 627 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . . § 924(c)(1) and (2). . . . . § 924(c)(1)(C)(i). He did not appeal. . . . Circuit case law has held that a Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence under the force clause of 924 . . .

UNITED STATES v. FITZGERALD,, 935 F.3d 814 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . . §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). . . .

BIRD, v. i DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES DHS, R., 935 F.3d 738 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Owens-Illinois, Inc. , 665 F.2d 918, 924 (9th Cir. 1982) (internal quotation omitted), the essence of . . . Williams , 665 F.2d at 924 (quoting Reed , 613 F.2d at 760 ); see Del. State Coll. v. . . . See Williams , 665 F.2d at 924 ("[C]ontinuing impact from past violations is not actionable." . . .

IN RE BOWLES,, 935 F.3d 1210 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . Calderon, 151 F.3d 918, 924 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc). . . . See Thompson, 151 F.3d at 924. . . . Thompson, 151 F.3d at 924. . . . Thompson, 151 F.3d at 924. . . . Dep't of Corr, 924 F.3d 1330, 1338-39 (11th Cir. 2019). . . . Dep't of Corr., 924 F.3d 1330, 1339 n.5 (11th Cir. 2019). . . . Smith, 924 F.3d at 1339 (quoting Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 735 ) (quotation marks omitted). . . . See 924 F.3d at 1339 n.5. . . .

PEREZ- SANCHEZ, v. U. S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,, 935 F.3d 1148 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . Cortez, 930 F.3d 350, 358-62 (4th Cir. 2019) ; Ortiz-Santiago, 924 F.3d at 963-64. . . . See Cortez, 930 F.3d at 360 ; Ortiz-Santiago, 924 F.3d at 962-63. . . . See Ortiz-Santiago, 924 F.3d at 963 ("While an agency may adopt rules and processes to maintain order . . . See Pierre-Paul, 930 F.3d at 691-92 ; Cortez, 930 F.3d at 360-62 ; Ortiz-Santiago, 924 F.3d at 963-64 . . . See Ortiz-Santiago, 924 F.3d at 961-62. . . .

UNITED STATES v. HAWKINS, a. k. a. D III, a. k. a., 934 F.3d 1251 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . . § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) (Count Seventeen) 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (Count Eighteen) 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (Count . . . Twenty-Four) 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) (Count Twenty-Five) 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (Count Twenty-Six . . .

UNITED STATES v. A. HOPPER,, 934 F.3d 740 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Townsend , 924 F.2d 1385, 1394 (7th Cir. 1991). . . . Townsend , 924 F.2d at 1389 (internal quotation marks omitted). . . . Townsend , 924 F.2d at 1411. Because Mr. . . . Hopper based on drug transactions not related to the conspiracy in which he participated, see Townsend , 924 . . .

UNITED STATES v. V. GILLIAM,, 934 F.3d 854 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . . §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2), and sentenced to two consecutive 90-month imprisonment terms. . . .

COLE v. CARSON, v., 935 F.3d 444 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . Ct. 2448, 2470, 201 L.Ed.2d 924 (2018). See also id. . . .

UNITED STATES v. MCCLOUD, II,, 935 F.3d 527 (6th Cir. 2019)

. . . Bartholomew , 310 F.3d 912, 924 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. . . .

BACA v. COLORADO DEPARTMENT OF STATE, G. T. L. M., 935 F.3d 887 (10th Cir. 2019)

. . . Op. at 924-25. We may not "recognize a cause of action that Congress has denied." . . .

UNITED STATES v. BEGAY,, 934 F.3d 1033 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . . § 924(c)(1)(A). We affirm Begay's conviction for second-degree murder. . . . We hold that second-degree murder is not a "crime of violence," reverse the § 924(c) count of conviction . . . Begay was convicted of discharging a firearm during a "crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). . . . Instead, in those cases, we found that other challenges to § 924(c) convictions lacked merit. . . . cannot stand under either the elements clause or residual clause of § 924(c)(3). . . .

BOWLES, v. DESANTIS,, 934 F.3d 1230 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 924 F.3d 1171, 1176 (11th Cir. 2019). . . . Long, 924 F.3d at 1176. . . . Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 650, 124 S.Ct. 2117, 158 L.Ed.2d 924 (2004) (recognizing "the State's significant . . .

R. MEIER v. ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI, CITY OF s St. H. St. St. St. St. G. a St. St. P. O. DSN, 934 F.3d 824 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295, 121 S.Ct. 924, 148 L.Ed.2d 807 (2001) ). . . .

UNITED STATES v. E. JONES,, 934 F.3d 842 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . . § 924(e)(1), based on five prior Missouri convictions for sale of a controlled substance. See Mo. . . . for ... a serious drug offense ... committed on occasions different from one another." 18 U.S.C. § 924 . . . ), for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed by law." 18 U.S.C. § 924 . . . categorical approach" and compare the elements of the state offense with the elements set forth in § 924 . . . So each of Jones's five convictions under § 195.211 matches the offense defined in § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) . . .

UNITED STATES v. L. CLARK,, 934 F.3d 843 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . . § 924(e)(2)(B). . . . See § 924(e)(1). . . . See § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) (defining "violent felony" to include offenses that "ha[ve] as an element the use . . .

UNITED STATES v. MERRITT,, 934 F.3d 809 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . . §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). . . .

AMAZON. COM, INC. v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,, 934 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Rep. 97-494, at 161 (1982), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 781, 924 (emphasis added). . . .

STATES v. RYAN,, 935 F.3d 40 (2nd Cir. 2019)

. . . . §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2). . . .

HARVILLE, v. CITY OF HOUSTON, MISSISSIPPI,, 935 F.3d 404 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . Republic Refining Co. , 924 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1991). . . .

UNITED STATES v. BROWN,, 935 F.3d 43 (2nd Cir. 2019)

. . . . § 924(c) when the judge selects sentences for underlying predicate offenses. . . . imposed for brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924 . . . judge from considering the severity of mandatory consecutive minimum sentences required by section 924 . . . Subsection 924(c)(1)(C) was amended last year to provide that only a second section 924(c) conviction . . . minimum 25-year sentence provided by subsection 924(c)(1)(C)(i). . . .

FORREST, v. UNITED STATES, 934 F.3d 775 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . . § 924(e)(1). . . . Id. § 924(e)(2)(B). . . . penalize a movant for a district court's discretionary choice not to specify under which clause of Section 924 . . .

UNITED STATES v. NORMAN,, 935 F.3d 232 (4th Cir. 2019)

. . . . §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2), and 924(e) ("Count 1"); (2) possession with intent to distribute a quantity . . . (3) possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924 . . .

UNITED STATES v. GILES,, 935 F.3d 553 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . . § 924(c). . . .

M. MURPHY v. A. A. ENGELHART, 933 F.3d 1027 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Id. at 924. In Ehlers v. . . .

ROMO, v. P. BARR,, 933 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . . § 924(c), which in turn ultimately relied upon 21 U.S.C. § 846, which covered only attempts or conspiracies . . .

UNITED STATES v. C. BROWN, v. N., 934 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . . § 924(c)(1)(A)(i). Later, the district court held a joint trial for Brown, Harris, and Ryan. . . .

IN RE MATTHEWS, In In In In III,, 934 F.3d 296 (3rd Cir. 2019)

. . . . § 924(c). . . . Each Petitioner's § 2255 motion argues that § 924(c)(3) 's residual clause is unconstitutionally vague . . . Davis , striking down § 924(c)(3)(B) as unconstitutionally vague. --- U.S. ----, 139 S. . . . Section 924(c)(3) defines "crime of violence" to mean a felony offense that "(A) has as an element the . . . Ct. at 2336 ("[ Section] 924(c)(3)(B) is unconstitutionally vague"). . . .

UNITED STATES v. POPE,, 934 F.3d 770 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . . §§ 1951(a), 2113(a), 924(c), 922(g). . . .

BARNES, v. CHASE HOME FINANCE, LLC, a USA, N. A. a JP Co. a IBM a, 934 F.3d 901 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . A 226.2(a) 924)-(5)(i) (emphasis added). . . .

UNITED STATES v. SIMS,, 933 F.3d 1009 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . . § 924(e)(1). . . . The ACCA specifically enumerates burglary as a violent felony. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). . . .

KOH, v. USTICH,, 933 F.3d 836 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Hartman , 924 F.3d 445, 448 (7th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). . . . Gant , 924 F.3d at 448. B. . . .

RAYMOND, v. UNITED STATES, 933 F.3d 988 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . . § 924(e). . . . explaining that "convictions under the Minnesota statutes that Raymond violated are violent felonies under § 924 . . . See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) and 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(a)(2) and 3583(b)(2). . . .

UNITED STATES v. BRAZIER,, 933 F.3d 796 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . . § 924(c) for using and discharging firearms during a crime of violence. . . . and this court, however, require us to reverse Fields' and Mzembe's convictions and sentences under § 924 . . . § 924(c). . . . The other way to satisfy § 924(c) is the elements clause, but we explained in United States v. . . . The § 924(c) convictions of Fields and Mzembe are REVERSED. . . .

UNITED STATES v. HATAWAY,, 933 F.3d 940 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . . §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e)(1). . . . use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another." 18 U.S.C. § 924 . . .

GREENWICH INSURANCE COMPANY v. CAPSCO INDUSTRIES, INCORPORATED, L. L. C., 934 F.3d 419 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . Munoz , 924 F.3d 753, 760 n.3 (5th Cir. 2019). . . .

UNITED STATES v. JONES,, 935 F.3d 266 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . . § 924-in connection with their activities as members of a New Orleans gang. . . . Appellants now seek vacatur of their § 924 convictions. . . . Among these were several convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 924. . . . In their briefs, they argue that their § 924 convictions are unconstitutional under Sessions v. . . . This suggests that the § 924 convictions were based on the RICO conspiracy predicate. . . .

COEUR D ALENE TRIBE, a v. W. HAWKS A., 933 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Graham , 489 U.S. 838, 841, 109 S.Ct. 1519, 103 L.Ed.2d 924 (1989) (holding a tribe's sovereign immunity . . .

UNITED STATES v. DAVIDSON,, 933 F.3d 912 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . . §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2). The district court sentenced him to 110 months' imprisonment. . . . Brockman , 924 F.3d 988, 993-94 (8th Cir. 2019) ; United States v. . . .

KIRSCHENBAUM, v. ASSA CORPORATION, Co., 934 F.3d 191 (2nd Cir. 2019)

. . . Republic of Palau , 924 F.2d 1237, 1243-44 (2d Cir. 1991) ). . . .

UNITED STATES v. WALKER,, 934 F.3d 375 (4th Cir. 2019)

. . . . § 924(c). . . . On appeal, Walker principally challenges his § 924(c) conviction. . . . Courts refer to § 924(c)(3)(A) as the "force clause" and to § 924(c)(3)(B) as the (now-invalid) "residual . . . We turn first to § 924(c)(3)(B), the residual clause. . . . Accordingly, we turn to the force clause, § 924(c)(3)(A). . . .

UNITED STATES v. GAMMELL, v., 932 F.3d 1175 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . . §§ 922(g) and 924(e). . . . See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) ("In the case of a person who violates section 922(g) of this title and has . . . explicitly rejected this distinction for the purposes of applicability of the ACCA: For purposes of § 924 . . .

PARENT PROFESSIONAL ADVOCACY LEAGUE M. W. a F. D. S. S. a S. Y. v. CITY OF SPRINGFIELD, MASSACHUSETTS J., 934 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 2019)

. . . Dist., 924 F.3d 621, 630 (1st Cir. 2019). . . .

UNITED STATES v. L. HARPER,, 934 F.3d 524 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . . § 924(c) ; possession of a firearm by a felon, id. § 922(g); and possession with intent to distribute . . . But section 924(c) does not require a completed transaction, and so it is irrelevant that Harper's trade . . . Instead, to violate section 924(c), a defendant must acquire possession of the gun during a drug deal . . . because the gun ended up in a locked tool box, he never truly "possessed" it as required by section 924 . . . Harper's close connection to the gun justified the section 924(c) charge. . . .

VALBRUNA SLATER STEEL CORPORATION, v. JOSLYN MANUFACTURING COMPANY,, 934 F.3d 553 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Sheriff's Dep't , 924 F.3d 375, 384 (7th Cir. 2019). 1. . . . Cal. , 523 F.3d 924, 931 (9th Cir. 2008). . . .

UNITED STATES v. BROWN, v. J., 932 F.3d 1011 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . . § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). In return, the government agreed to dismiss a second § 924(c) count. . . . reversing a sentence based on an incorrect reading of the mandatory-minimum provision of 18 U.S.C. § 924 . . .

UNITED STATES v. L. PAUL,, 932 F.3d 1163 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . . §§ 922(n), 924(a)(1)(D). . . .

HAIDAK, v. UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS- AMHERST, 933 F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 2019)

. . . Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 930, 117 S.Ct. 1807, 138 L.Ed.2d 120 (1997) )). . . .

UNITED STATES v. THOMAS,, 933 F.3d 605 (6th Cir. 2019)

. . . Shanklin , 924 F.3d 905, 919 (6th Cir. 2019), but review de novo a conclusion that a crime involved " . . .

UNITED STATES v. DANIELS,, 932 F.3d 1120 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . . §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). . . .

UNITED STATES v. HUNTER, 932 F.3d 610 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . . § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). . . . Cosby , 924 F.3d 329, 336 (7th Cir. 2019) (citation and internal quotation omitted). . . .

UNITED STATES v. J. JOHNSON,, 933 F.3d 540 (6th Cir. 2019)

. . . . § 924(e). . . . The court explained that because the Supreme Court had invalidated the residual clause found in § 924 . . . 176 L.Ed.2d 1 (2010), and because Johnson had not been convicted of any enumerated offenses, see § 924 . . . Because this definitional language is essentially the same as that in ACCA, see 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2) . . . (B)(i)-(ii), we look to caselaw interpreting § 924(e)(2)(B) to determine whether Johnson's crimes are . . .

UNITED STATES v. BONNELL,, 932 F.3d 1080 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . . §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2). . . .

UNITED STATES v. P. MAZZULLA, 932 F.3d 1091 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . . § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) ; and (V) distribution of and possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more . . .

JET MIDWEST INTERNATIONAL CO. LTD, v. JET MIDWEST GROUP, LLC, F. F. M., 932 F.3d 1102 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Ritchie , 631 F.3d 919, 924 (8th Cir. 2011). Thus, we grant both motions. . . .

WARREN, v. FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION,, 932 F.3d 378 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . Tucker , 806 S.W.2d 914, 924 (Tex. App. . . .

UNITED STATES v. LAUREANO- SALGADO, a k a L. a k a, 933 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2019)

. . . . § 924(c)(1)(A). . . .

UNITED STATES v. D. RIVERA- CARRASQUILLO, a k a KX, a k a a k a a k a n V a k a, 933 F.3d 33 (1st Cir. 2019)

. . . . §§ 924(c)(1)(A), 924(j)(1) and (2) ; • knowingly transferring a firearm for use during VICAR murders . . . , see 18 U.S.C. § 924(h) ; • conspiring to engage in drug trafficking, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 846, 860; and . . . • conspiring to possess firearms during drug-trafficking crimes, see 18 U.S.C. § 924(o). . . . violence" - i.e. , VICAR murder predicated on Puerto Rico's murder statute - in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924 . . .

CORDEIRO, v. M. SAUL,, 391 F. Supp. 3d 170 (D. Mass. 2019)

. . . App'x 924, 927 (3d Cir. 2006) (faulting the ALJ for drawing a negative inference from the claimant's . . .

UNITED STATES v. COLLIER,, 932 F.3d 1067 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Stephenson , 924 F.2d 753, 758 (8th Cir. 1991) ). . . .

UNITED STATES v. THOMAS, v., 933 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . . § 924(c). . . . violated the Speedy Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment, and that the jury instructions for 18 U.S.C. § 924 . . . See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). . . . Section 924(c) provides that "any person who, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug . . . The minimum consecutive sentence is increased to seven years "if the firearm is brandished." § 924(c) . . .

D. LEISER, v. KLOTH,, 933 F.3d 696 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Hartman , 924 F.3d 445, 451 (7th Cir. 2019) (dismissing officer's appeal of denial of qualified immunity . . .

UNITED STATES v. JOHN, 391 F. Supp. 3d 458 (E.D. Pa. 2019)

. . . Johnson, 816 F.2d 918, 924 (3d Cir. 1987). . . . See Claxton, 766 F.3d at 304 ; Johnson, 816 F.2d at 924 ; Higgs, 713 F.2d at 43-44. . . .

IN RE POLLARD,, 931 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . . § 924(c)(1)(A) and (B)(i). . . . conviction and sentence became final, Pollard has filed two 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motions challenging his § 924 . . . Pollard now asks this Court for permission to file a third § 2255 motion, contending that his § 924(c . . . In denying some of those applications, we reasoned that even if § 924(c)(3)(B) 's residual clause was . . . This Court has already held that armed robbery of a bank qualifies as a crime of violence under § 924 . . .

UNITED STATES v. DUKE,, 932 F.3d 1056 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . . § 924(c)(1) (1988). . . .

UNITED STATES v. CLARK, 932 F.3d 1064 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . . § 924(e)(1). In 1999, Clark was convicted in Illinois of conspiring to distribute cocaine. . . . "We review de novo whether a prior conviction is a predicate offense under [ 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) ]. . . . related to the object of the conspiracy" were "separate qualifying predicate offenses" under 18 U.S.C. § 924 . . .

UNITED STATES v. MATHIS, a k a a k a a k a D- v. a k a a k a v. a k a a k a a k a v. a k a a k a K. a k a a k a v. a k a a k a a k a v. a k a a k a a k a a k a, 932 F.3d 242 (4th Cir. 2019)

. . . crimes of violence under the statute's "force clause," 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A). . . . to a "crime of violence." 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). . . . We refer to Section 924(c)(3)(A) as the "force clause," and to Section 924(c)(3)(B) as the "residual . . . clause" or the "924(c) residual clause." . . . See Descamps , 570 U.S. at 261, 133 S.Ct. 2276 ; 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A). . . .

UNITED STATES v. OLOYEDE, v. a k a a k a v. a k a a k a T. v. a k a, 933 F.3d 302 (4th Cir. 2019)

. . . . § 924(c) - which prohibits using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to any crime of violence . . .

UNITED STATES v. BUCHANAN,, 933 F.3d 501 (6th Cir. 2019)

. . . Acosta , 924 F.3d 288, 299 (6th Cir. 2019) (alterations in original) (citations omitted). . . .

IN RE NAVARRO,, 931 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . . § 924(c) (Count Five). . . . Ct. 1204, 200 L.Ed.2d 549 (2018), to § 924(c) and held that § 924(c)(3)(B) 's residual clause, like the . . . Navarro's § 924(c) Claim Navarro has not made a prima facie showing that, regarding his § 924(c) conviction . . . . § 924(c)(1)(A). . . . (c) conviction. 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A), (c)(2). . . . . § 924(c) claim. . . .

IN RE M. PALACIOS,, 931 F.3d 1314 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . . §§ 922(g) and 924(a)(2), based on the assertion that the government failed to allege and prove he had . . . In Bailey , the Supreme Court construed 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), which, at the time, imposed a prison term . . . criminal statute does not reach certain conduct" and determined that pre- Bailey applications of § 924 . . . As a result, as the Court determined in Bousley with respect to pre- Bailey applications of § 924(c)( . . . 1), pre- Rehaif applications of §§ 922(g) and 924(a)(2) "necessarily carr[y] a significant risk that . . . . § 924(a)(2) -which provides that anyone who "knowingly violates" § 922(g) can be imprisoned for up . . .

UNITED STATES v. CORNETTE,, 932 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 2019)

. . . . § 924(e). Cornette now contends that in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. . . . Under 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2), this conviction carries a maximum prison sentence of ten years. . . . different from one another ... shall be ... imprisoned not less than fifteen years[.]" 18 U.S.C. § 924 . . . involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another[.] 18 U.S.C. § 924 . . . not penalize a movant for a court's discretionary choice not to specify under which clause of Section 924 . . .

UNITED STATES v. HENNESSEE,, 932 F.3d 437 (6th Cir. 2019)

. . . The government sought an enhanced penalty under § 924(e)(1) based on Hennessee's three prior convictions . . . Tennessee-that qualified as violent felonies under the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"), 18 U.S.C. § 924 . . . whether the two offenses were "committed on occasions different from one another," as required under § 924 . . . convictions ... for a violent felony ... committed on occasions different from one another." 18 U.S.C. § 924 . . . See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). . . .

UNITED STATES v. D. JACKSON, v. D., 932 F.3d 556 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . . § 924(c)(3)(B) -which partially defines "crime of violence" for § 924-is unconstitutionally vague. . . . On February 24, 2017, we relied on Cardena to vacate Antwon Jenkins's conviction under § 924(c)(1)(A) . . . Davis , 903 F.3d 483 (5th Cir. 2018) (also holding that § 924(c)(3)(B) is unconstitutionally vague). . . . Now, the Supreme Court has found that § 924(c)(3)(B) is unconstitutional. --- U.S. ----, 139 S. . . . Accordingly, § 924(c)(3)(B) is unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 2336-55. . . .

CHRONIS, v. UNITED STATES, 932 F.3d 544 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Bd. , 880 F.3d 913, 924 (7th Cir. 2018), as amended on denial of reh'g and reh'g en banc (June 19, 2018 . . . See, e.g., Delgado , 880 F.3d at 924 (stringent application of a statute's "exhaustion requirement can . . .

WINDING CREEK SOLAR LLC, v. PETERMAN, 932 F.3d 861 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Stefanchik , 559 F.3d 924, 927 (9th Cir. 2009). . . .

UNITED STATES v. OCHOA,, 932 F.3d 866 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Daniels , 541 F.3d 915, 924 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). . . .

UNITED STATES v. CHARLES, II,, 932 F.3d 153 (4th Cir. 2019)

. . . . § 924(e) (the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA")). . . . purposes of sentencing on the firearm conviction, an armed career criminal under ACCA, 18 U.S.C. § 924 . . . his firearm conviction of 15 years' imprisonment and a maximum of life imprisonment, see 18 U.S.C. § 924 . . . enhancement of what would otherwise have been a maximum sentence of 10 years' imprisonment, see id . § 924 . . .

UNITED STATES v. D. WISEMAN, Jr., 932 F.3d 411 (6th Cir. 2019)

. . . . §§ 922(g)(1) & 924. . . . Step Act and 21 U.S.C. § 802(57) covers a smaller set of crimes, offenses "described in [ 18 U.S.C. §] 924 . . .

UNITED STATES v. BONIN,, 932 F.3d 523 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Richmond , 924 F.3d 404, 411 (7th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted). . . .

DEXTER, a k a v. DEALOGIC, LLC,, 390 F. Supp. 3d 233 (D. Mass. 2019)

. . . Fleet Nat'l Bank, 456 Mass. 562, 924 N.E.2d 696, 704 (2010) ). . . . Nickerson, 924 N.E.2d at 704 ). Dexter alleges two breaches of the implied covenant. . . .

IN RE CANNON,, 931 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . . § 924(c) & (o) (Count 3). . . . We recognize that Cannon argues that (1) his firearm § 924(c) and § 924(o) counts in Counts 3, 6, and . . . conviction may implicate § 924(c)(3)(B) 's residual clause and Davis . . . . (o) conviction in Count 3 and DENIED as to his § 924(c) convictions in Counts 6 and 14. . . . . § 16(b), not § 924(c). . . .

MEJIA- CASTANON, v. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 931 F.3d 224 (3rd Cir. 2019)

. . . Barr , 924 F.3d 956, 957-58, 962-64 (7th Cir. 2019) ; Ali v. . . . Barr , 924 F.3d 983, 986 (8th Cir. 2019) ; Banegas Gomez v. . . .

In MATTER OF BENJAMIN, v., 932 F.3d 293 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . EDITH BROWN CLEMENT, Circuit Judge: We withdraw our prior opinion, 924 F.3d 180, and substitute the following . . .

UNITED STATES v. RODRIGUEZ- SORIANO, a k a a k a, 931 F.3d 281 (4th Cir. 2019)

. . . . § 924(a)(1)(A). . . . Section 924(a)(1)(A) prohibits individuals from knowingly making any false statement or representation . . . Nelson , 221 F.3d 1206, 1209-10 (11th Cir. 2000) (affirming § 924(a)(1)(A) conviction of defendants who . . . on an ATF Form 4473 as to the identity of the actual buyer of a firearm constitutes a violation of § 924 . . . To establish a violation of § 924(a)(1)(A), the government must prove: (1) the dealer was a federally . . . . § 924(a)(1)(A). . . .