Amendments to 810.02

1. James v. United States

   550 U.S. 192 (2007)   Cited 735 times

   Burglary under Florida law differs from "generic" burglary in a second respect: It extends not just to entries of structures, but also of "conveyance[s]." Fla. Stat. §810.02(1). But because James (in accordance with what appears to be the general practice in Florida) was specifically charged with and convicted of "attempted burglary of a dwelling," we need not examine this point further.

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2. Williams v. Warden, Fed. Bureau of Prisons

   713 F.3d 1332 (11th Cir. 2013)   Cited 304 times

   • Motion to dismiss
   4 more...

   No Eleventh Circuit precedent squarely held that burglary of a dwelling, as defined in Fla. Stat. § 810.02, was a violent felony for ACCA purposes during Williams's direct and collateral attacks. In United States v. Hill, 863 F.2d 1575, 1581–82 (11th Cir.1989), a panel of this Court had held that § 810.02 was a burglary under the ACCA's enumerated felonies clause and thus was categorically a violent felony. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990), however, abrogated Hill.Taylor held that, for a state law offense to qualify as a burglary under the enumerated felonies clause, the offense had to require entry into an actual building or structure; thus, the Court held that a Missouri burglary statute, which criminalized entry of locations other than a structure, was not categorically a burglary for ACCA purposes. See id. at 599, 110 S.Ct. 2143. Since Fla. Stat. § 810.02 defines dwelling to include both the structure and its surrounding curtilage, Taylor rendered it impossible to hold that § 810.02 was categorically a violent felony under the ACCA's enumerated felonies clause. After Taylor abrogated Hill…

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3. United States v. Matchett

   802 F.3d 1185 (11th Cir. 2015)   Cited 427 times   3 Legal Analyses

   1 more...

   The presentence investigation report calculated a base offense level of 24 with a criminal history category of IV and a guideline range of 77 to 96 months of imprisonment. The calculated range included an enhancement for Matchett's two prior felony convictions for “crime[s] of violence,” United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2K2.1(a)(2) (Nov.2014), and a two-level enhancement for “recklessly creat[ing] a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another person in the course of fleeing from a law enforcement officer,” U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2. At sentencing, Matchett objected to both of these enhancements. He argued that his prior felony convictions for burglary of an unoccupied dwelling, Fla. Stat. § 810.02(1)(b), (3)(b), were not “crime[s] of violence.” He also argued that he neither attempted to flee nor recklessly endangered anyone.

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4. Johnson v. Florida

   513 F.3d 1328 (11th Cir. 2008)   Cited 122 times

   Johnson's innocence claim is based on the Florida Supreme Court's Delgado decision in 2000, discussed below, that interpreted the state's burglary statute. At the time of Johnson's 1991 trial, Florida defined burglary statutorily as "entering or remaining in a dwelling, a structure, or a conveyance with the intent to commit an offense therein, unless the premises are at the time open to the public or the defendant is licensed or invited to enter or remain." Fla. Stat. Ann. § 810.02(1) (1989).Interpreting § 810.02(1), the Third District Florida Court of Appeal had held that if a defendant enters a structure by consent, he may nevertheless be guilty of burglary under § 810.02(1) if the evidence demonstrates that the consent, either expressly or implicitly, was withdrawn. Ray v. State, 522 So.2d 963, 965-67 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1988). Once consent is withdrawn, the Florida appellate court reasoned in Ray, the offender's unlawful "remaining in" the premises sufficed to establish burglary, even though he did not unlawfully "enter." Id.

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5. U.S. v. Gomez-Guerra

   485 F.3d 301 (5th Cir. 2007)   Cited 28 times

   The Florida statute defining the terms of Fla. Stat. § 810.02(3) states that "dwelling" is "a building or conveyance of any kind, including any attached porch, whether such building or conveyance is temporary or permanent, mobile or immobile, which has a roof over it and is designed to be occupied by people lodging therein at night, together with the curtilage thereof." Fla. Stat. § 810.011(2) (1995) (emphasis added); see also Baker v. State, 636 So.2d 1342, 1344 (Fla. 1994) ("Entry onto the curtilage is, for the purposes of the burglary statute, entry into the structure or dwelling.")

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6. Miller v. State

   733 So. 2d 955 (Fla. 1998)   Cited 38 times

   First, we address Miller's burglary conviction. Section 810.02(1), Florida Statutes (1993), defines burglary:

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7. Borges v. State

   415 So. 2d 1265 (Fla. 1982)   Cited 124 times

   See § 810.02(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (1977) (burglary while armed), § 810.06 (possession of burglary tools), § 790.23 (possession of firearm by convicted felon), and § 790.01(2) (carrying concealed firearm).
8. U.S. v. Davis

   881 F.2d 973 (11th Cir. 1989)   Cited 13 times

   Appellant argues that because the use of force against a person is not an element of Fla.Stat. § 810.02(3), it does not constitute a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a). We need not resolve this question since we conclude that appellant's offense constituted a crime of violence under section 16(b). Nevertheless, we note that section 16(a) encompasses not only offenses involving the use of force against persons, but also those offenses involving the use of force against property — an inherent element of the common law offense of burglary. See W. LaFave A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law § 8.13(a) (1986). The Florida burglary law incorporates this offense element by excusing entry into properties open to the public and licensed entries onto property. See Fla.Stat. § 810.02(1) (1987).

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9. U.S. v. Matthews

   466 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir. 2006)   Cited 68 times

   At the relevant times, Florida law defined third-degree felony burglary as an unprivileged entry into an unoccupied structure or an unoccupied conveyance with intent to commit an offense therein. Fla. Stat. § 810.02. A structure was defined to include the curtilage of the structure. Fla. Stat. § 810.011(1). Florida case law construes curtilage narrowly, to include only an enclosed area surrounding a structure. See State v. Hamilton, 660 So.2d 1038, 1044 (Fla. 1995); Henry v. State, 707 So.2d 370, 372 (Fla.App. 1 Dist. 1998)

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10. Torna v. State

    742 So. 2d 366 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)   Cited 16 times

    We urge that, in future cases involving charges of a violation of section 810.02(2)(a), the jury be tendered a verdict form that clearly indicates — perhaps by boxes to be checked of — whether the conviction is of burglary with an assault or burglary with a battery, so as to avoid the double jeopardy issues addressed in the instant case.