Cases from cite.case.law:

CONTI, v. AUCHTER, 266 So. 3d 1250 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . See § 627.737, Fla. . . .

L. SWANSON, v. M. BEILMAN,, 216 So. 3d 784 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . See § 627.737(2), Fla. Stat. (2010). AFFIRMED. ORFINGER, TORPY and EVANDER, JJ., concur. . . .

GEICO GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, v. A. DIXON,, 209 So. 3d 77 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . See §§ 627.727, 627.737, Fla. . . .

CATHERINE S. CADLE, v. GEICO GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY,, 838 F.3d 1113 (11th Cir. 2016)

. . . The Florida Supreme Court has explained the interrelationship of § 627.727(7) and § 627.737(2) regarding . . . Stat. § 627.737(2)(b)) (emphasis added). . . . Stat. § 627.737(2)(b). . . . Stat. § 627.737(2)(a)-(d). . . . . Stat. § 627.737(2)(a)-(d)); see Fla. Standard Jury Instruction 501.3. . . . .

R. BATCHELOR, v. GEICO CASUALTY COMPANY,, 142 F. Supp. 3d 1220 (M.D. Fla. 2015)

. . . The PI Requirement is set forth in the Policy and in Florida Statutes, § 627.737(2). . . .

HARRIS, v. GEICO GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, a, 619 F. App'x 896 (11th Cir. 2015)

. . . Accord § 627.737(2)(b). . . .

WIGGINS, v. ALLSTATE PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY,, 94 F. Supp. 3d 1276 (S.D. Fla. 2015)

. . . . §§ 627.727(7) & 627.737(2)(a)-(d). . . . Stat. § 627.737(2)(b) [D.E. 74 at 4-6, 9-10]. . . . Stat. § 627.737(2)(b) at trial with the standard for determining whether an insurer acted in good faith . . .

In ENGLE PROGENY CASES, 53 F. Supp. 3d 591 (E.D.N.Y. 2014)

. . . . § 627.737(2). There is no analogous requirement in any other type of case. . . .

HARRIS, v. GEICO GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY,, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1223 (S.D. Fla. 2013)

. . . . § 627.737(2). . . . anguish and inconvenience unless the injury or disease described in one or more paragraphs (a)-(d) of § 627.737 . . . or his uninsured motorist carrier, must first meet the threshold requirements enumerated in section 627.737 . . . car accident wherein the victim attempted to prove the presence of a permanent injury as defined by § 627.737 . . . 1984) (noting that “medical testimony is necessary in establishing a permanent injury under section 627.737 . . .

In STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CIVIL CASE- REPORT NO., 130 So. 3d 596 (Fla. 2013)

. . . following elements: NOTE ON USE FOR 501.1 If there is an issue of limitation on damages because of F.S. 627.737 . . . See F.S. 627.737(2) (1991). . . . there is proof that a claimant will incur future damages that are not excluded from recovery by F.S. 627.737 . . . See F.S. 627.737(2) (1991); Auto-Owners Insurance Co. v. Tompkins, 651 So.2d 89 (Fla.1995). . . . F.S. 627.737(2) (1991) does not define “permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability . . .

DUCLOS, v. RICHARDSON,, 113 So. 3d 1001 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . damages for injury to her neck resulting from an automobile accident with the defendant, under section 627.737 . . .

JIMINEZ, v. FACCONE,, 98 So. 3d 621 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . Jiminez was entitled to the threshold defense under section 627.737, Florida Statutes (1997), requiring . . . recover noneconomic damages “for pain, .suffering, mental anguish, and inconvenience” under section 627.737 . . . Pursuant to section 627.737(2), a part of Florida’s no-fault laws, a plaintiff may not recover noneco-nomic . . . Jiminez met the first requirement of section 627.737(2) — as owner and operator of a vehicle on the roads . . .

B. WALD, Jr. v. F. GRAINGER,, 64 So. 3d 1201 (Fla. 2011)

. . . The First District concluded that section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (2007), precluded the jury from . . . Section 627.737(2)(b) provides that a plaintiff may recover damages in tort for pain, suffering, mental . . .

ANGELUCCI v. GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INSURANCE COMPANY, a, 412 F. App'x 206 (11th Cir. 2011)

. . . . § 627.737. Thereafter, the Angeluceis filed suit against GEICO, seeking the benefits. . . .

GEICO GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, v. CIRILLO- MEIJER,, 50 So. 3d 681 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . . § 627.737(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2010). . . . Scaringelli, 189 N.J. 558, 917 A.2d 734, 743 (2007) (interpreting a statute similar to section 627.737 . . .

In STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CIVIL CASES- REPORT NO. In No. In No. In No. In No. s In No. In No. In No. In No., 35 So. 3d 666 (Fla. 2010)

. . . NOTE ON USE FOR 501.1 If there is an issue of limitation on damages because of F.S. 627.737(2), use instruction . . . See F.S. 627.737(2) (1991). . . . there is proof that a claimant will incur future damages that are not excluded from recovery by F.S. 627.737 . . . See F.S. 627.737(2) (1991); Auto-Owners Insurance Co. v. Tompkins, 651 So.2d 89 (Fla.1995). . . . F.S. 627.737(2) (1991) does not define “permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability . . .

TRUMBULL INSURANCE COMPANY, a d b a v. WOLENTARSKI,, 2 So. 3d 1050 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . Wolentarski also moved to strike the School Board’s section 627.737(2) affirmative defense. . . . Wol-entarski moved to strike the School Board’s section 627.737 defense. The motion was granted. . . . Section 627.737(2) limits damages in tort actions against owners, registrants, operators, and occupants . . .

UNITED AUTOMOBILE INS. CO. v. CUSTER MEDICAL CENTER a a o, 990 So. 2d 633 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . See § 627.737(2)(a)-(d), Fla. Stat. (1997). . . .

F. GRAINGER, v. B. WALD, Jr., 982 So. 2d 42 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . See § 627.737(2), Fla. Stat. . . .

STAKEM, III, v. RANDOLPH, Co., 228 F. App'x 600 (6th Cir. 2007)

. . . mental anguish, or inconvenience”) that arise out of a “serious injury,” as defined by Florida Statute § 627.737 . . .

MERCURY INSURANCE COMPANY OF FLORIDA, v. A. MORETA,, 957 So. 2d 1242 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . The bodily injury must be a serious injury as described in Section 627.737(2) of the Florida Motor Vehicle . . .

FULL CIRCLE DAIRY LLC, v. R. McKINNEY, II,, 467 F. Supp. 2d 1343 (M.D. Fla. 2006)

. . . Dillon, 415 So.2d 12, 17 (Fla.1982) (limitations in Florida’s no fault statute, § 627.737, provide a . . .

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, v. NICHOLS, v., 932 So. 2d 1067 (Fla. 2006)

. . . . § 627.737, Fla. Stat. (2001). . . .

STAKEM, III, v. RANDOLPH,, 431 F. Supp. 2d 782 (E.D. Tenn. 2006)

. . . . § 627.737(2), which are incorporated into the subject policy. . . . Ann. § 627.737(2). . . . The provisions of F.S. 627.737, F.S.A, do provide a reasonable alternative to the traditional action . . . Ann. § 627.737(2) in order to recover UM benefits for non-economic damages where the tortfeasor could . . . Stakem agrees, that only section 627.737(2)(b), which addresses “permanent injury within a reasonable . . .

FRIED, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY,, 904 So. 2d 566 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

. . . The problem with that theory is that under sections 627.727 and 627.737, Florida Statutes, an insured . . .

F. KOLETZKE, Jr. v. SMALL,, 900 So. 2d 752 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

. . . attorneys that it is not safe in this type of an action involving the no-fault threshold under section 627.737 . . .

STERNBERG v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY,, 900 So. 2d 732 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

. . . that the trial court erred in requiring them to prove a permanent injury under sections 627.727(7) and 627.737 . . . providing UM coverage limited coverage for non-economic damages to injuries as described in section 627.737 . . .

NORMAN, v. FARROW,, 880 So. 2d 557 (Fla. 2004)

. . . Section 627.737(1) limits an injured party's entitlement to bring suit in tort by stating in pertinent . . . suffering, mental anguish, and inconvenience for such injury under the provisions of subsection (2). § 627.737 . . .

EDWARDS, d b a R D Co. v. SAFEGUARD INSURANCE COMPANY,, 323 F. Supp. 2d 1263 (M.D. Fla. 2004)

. . . contends that Count II fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted in that Florida Statute § 627.737 . . . The parties have filed supplemental memo-randa addressing the applicability of Florida Statute § 627.737 . . . To the extent Plaintiff points to the title of § 627.737 in support of his argument, the Court is not . . . Nales, in dicta, discussed § 627.737(4) only in the context that it was added to § 627.737 in 1977, demonstrating . . . The plain language of § 627.737(4) renders it applicable to the instant action. . . .

ADVENTIST HEALTH SYSTEM SUNBELT, INC. v. FLORIDA BIRTH- RELATED NEUROLOGICAL INJURY, 865 So. 2d 561 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

. . . whether an injured plaintiff suffered an injury that satisfies the permanency threshold under section 627.737 . . . In cases involving the issue of permanency under section 627.737(2), the jury is instructed to determine . . .

MEYER, v. A. HUTCHINSON F., 861 So. 2d 1185 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)

. . . which would entitle them to recover for pain, suffering, mental anguish and inconvenience under section 627.737 . . . Section 627.737, Florida Statutes, is the authority for a “threshold defense” under which Meyer contends . . . her Michigan insurance policy provides. ' The pertinent parts of section 627.737 include: (1) Every . . . Before a claimant can recover the non-economic damages, described in section 627.737(2), the claimant . . . must establish a threshold injury as described in section 627.737(2)(a)-(d). . . .

NICHOLS, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL,, 851 So. 2d 742 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)

. . . . § 627.737, Fla. Stat. (2001). . . . the right to recover for intangible damages to the extent covered by the required insurance (F.S. s 627.737 . . .

SWEITZER, v. M. THOMAS,, 834 So. 2d 283 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)

. . . Appellant’s entitlement to the exemption from liability afforded by section 627.737, Florida Statutes . . . of life — may be recovered from a defendant who enjoys exemption from liability pursuant to section 627.737 . . . This interpretation of section 627.737 is consistent with the purpose of the statute, which is to permit . . . Furthermore, we agree with the conclusion of Giles that the language in section 627.737(1), specifically . . . These elements of noneconomic damages are not specifically referenced in section 627.737(2), Florida . . .

STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS- CIVIL CASES NOS., 825 So. 2d 277 (Fla. 2002)

. . . there is proof that a claimant will incur future damages that are not excluded from recovery by section 627.737 . . . See section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1991). 2. . . . See § 627.737(2), Fla. Stat. (1991); Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Tompkins, 651 So.2d 89 (Fla.1995). . . . support the claim on the issue of permanency, then your verdict should be for the defendant.” 3.Section 627.737 . . .

GILES v. LUCKIE,, 816 So. 2d 248 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)

. . . Section 627.737(1) provides in pertinent part that every owner, registrant, operator, or occupant of . . . Therefore, they argue that the threshold requirements in section 627.737(2) apply only to those four . . . In Smiley, the second district reasoned that the tort exemption in section 627.737(1) extends to all . . . Although this interpretation brings into question the language at the end of section 627.737(1), that . . . In accordance with the long-understood meaning of this provision, we conclude that section 627.737(2) . . .

TERRI VAN WINKLE, P. A. v. JOHNSTON, 813 So. 2d 1065 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)

. . . carrier does not include damages in tort for pain and suffering unless the injury is described in section 627.737 . . .

WELCH, v. FEGA, 800 So. 2d 327 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)

. . . We are persuaded by the second district’s interpretation of section 627.737, Florida Statutes (1999), . . .

UNITED AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, v. RODRIGUEZ, v., 808 So. 2d 82 (Fla. 2001)

. . . . § 627.737(1), F.S.A.); furthermore, the accident victim is assured of some recovery even where he himself . . .

SMILEY A. v. A. NELSON, 805 So. 2d 870 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)

. . . Section 627.737(1) provides that every owner, operator, or occupant of a motor vehicle for which security . . . Nelson did not satisfy the perma-neney threshold of section 627.737. . . . Section 627.737(1) exempts a defendant from tort liability for damages because of bodily injury arising . . . Punitive damages are not mentioned in section 627.737. . . . Section 627.737, however, does contemplate compensatory noneconomic damages. . . .

LORING, Jr. v. K. WINTERS,, 802 So. 2d 335 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)

. . . Loring argued to the trial court that under section 627.737, Florida Statutes (1993), he was entitled . . . Section 627.737 plainly intends to exempt owners, registrants, operators, or occupants from tort liability . . . Section 627.737, Florida Statutes (1993), provides in pertinent part: (1) Every owner, registrant, operator . . .

M. OWEN, v. R. MORRISEY, Jr. B., 793 So. 2d 1018 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)

. . . These non-economic damages are precluded under section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1993), absent a . . . finding of a permanent injury; however, there is nothing in section 627.737(2) that precludes an award . . . Section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1993), provides: (2) In any action of tort brought against the . . .

MALDONADO, v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY,, 789 So. 2d 464 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)

. . . The law was very controversial in 1971 because section 627.737 created a “no-fault threshold” and took . . . payment of personal injury benefits under section 627.736 and in the immunity provided under section 627.737 . . .

STATE v. BRADFORD,, 787 So. 2d 811 (Fla. 2001)

. . . .; see also § 627.737(2), Fla.Stat. (1997). .Attached to the legislative history of this chapter law . . .

ALLSTATE INDEMNITY COMPANY, v. WISE a k a Jr., 818 So. 2d 524 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)

. . . See § 627.737, Fla. Stat. (2000). . . . .

BUDGET RENT- A- CAR SYSTEMS, INC. v. CASTELLANO, a, 764 So. 2d 889 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)

. . . . § 627.737(1), Fla. Stat. (1997). . . . district courts were in conflict as to the definition of “payable” as used in sections 627.736(3) and 627.737 . . . any insurance policy or other method of security complying with the requirements of s. 627.733.... § 627.737 . . .

ROLLINS, v. PIZZARELLI,, 761 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 2000)

. . . Lastly, we disagree with the dissents in this case that our prior case law construing section 627.737 . . . Gulf Breeze Enterprises, Inc., 403 So.2d 1325 (Fla.1981), we upheld the constitutionality of section 627.737 . . . In discussing the provisions of section 627.737(3) in effect at that time, we stated that “[t]o prevent . . .

SHEFFIELD, v. SUPERIOR INSURANCE COMPANY,, 741 So. 2d 533 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)

. . . ." § 627.737(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (1995). . . . .” § 627.737(2)(b), Fla. . . .

BUDGET RENT- A- CAR SYSTEMS, INC. v. CASTELLANO, a, 737 So. 2d 574 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)

. . . . § 627.737(1), Fla. Stat. (1997). . . . district courts were in conflict as to the definition of “payable” as used in sections 627.736(3) and 627.737 . . . any insurance policy or other method of security complying with the requirements of § 627.733.... § 627.737 . . .

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, v. DIXON, 732 So. 2d 1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)

. . . for non-economic damages where the insured did not first meet the threshold requirements of section 627.737 . . . in the State Farm policy, require that a party’s injury be a serious injury as described in section 627.737 . . . unless the injury or disease is described in one or more of paragraphs (a) through (d) of section] 627.737 . . . or his uninsured motorist carrier, must first meet the threshold requirements enumerated in section 627.737 . . . Section 627.737(2)(a)-(d) provides: In any action of tort brought against the owner, registrant, operator . . .

A. MEDINA, Sr. v. PERALTA,, 724 So. 2d 1188 (Fla. 1999)

. . . completely in conflict with the parties’ agreement and, more important, with the mandatory terms of section 627.737 . . .

T. GOLDEN, v. TIPTON,, 723 So. 2d 871 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)

. . . See § 627.737, Fla. Stat. (1993). . . .

STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS- CIVIL CASES NO., 723 So. 2d 174 (Fla. 1998)

. . . there is proof that a claimant will incur future damages that are not excluded from recovery by section 627.737 . . . See section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1991). 2. . . . See § 627.737(2), Fla. Stat. (1991); Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Tompkins, 651 So.2d 89 (Fla. 1995). . . . Section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1991), does not define “permanent injury within a reasonable degree . . .

MATIYOSUS v. KEATEN, 717 So. 2d 1097 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)

. . . See § 627.737(2), Fla. Stat. See also Chapman v. . . .

M. ASSI, v. FLORIDA AUTO AUCTION OF ORLANDO, INC., 717 So. 2d 588 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)

. . . . § 627.737(1), Fla. . . . . § 627.737, Fla. Stat. . § 737.736(4)(d), Fla. Stat. See Mansfield v. . . .

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, v. KLINGLESMITH,, 717 So. 2d 569 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)

. . . We held in Kokotis that the setoff provision contained in section 627.737 (the tort exemption statute . . .

DERIUS, v. ALLSTATE INDEMNITY COMPANY,, 723 So. 2d 271 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)

. . . presented in this case is analogous to that arising under another portion of the No-Fault Law, section 627.737 . . . permanency, the Supreme Court Committee on Standard Jury Instructions in Civil Cases observed: Section 627.737 . . . The Supreme Court authorized the use of the Committee’s proposed instruction on section 627.737(2). . . .

A. HOLT, v. KING,, 707 So. 2d 1141 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)

. . . . § 627.737(1), Fla. Stat. (1995). . . . or her own insurer, where the injury fails to reach the permanent injury threshold found in section 627.737 . . .

A. MEDINA, Sr. v. PERALTA,, 705 So. 2d 703 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)

. . . completely in conflict with the parties’ agreement and, more important, with the mandatory terms of section 627.737 . . .

ALLSTATE INDEMNITY COMPANY, v. DIAZ,, 701 So. 2d 94 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)

. . . In Dauksis, the Supreme Court reviewed the interplay of sections 627.727(7) and 627.737(2), Florida Statutes . . . against the uninsured motorist carrier without first satisfying the threshold requirements of section 627.737 . . .

MATTER, v. B. WHITE,, 695 So. 2d 942 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)

. . . See § 627.737(2), Fla.Stat. (1995). City of Tampa v. . . .

JONES, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY,, 694 So. 2d 165 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)

. . . Rather than pay the bill within the thirty-day period provided for in section 627.737, Florida Statutes . . . The complaint sought PIP benefits and alleged that State Farm had violated section 627.737 because of . . .

C. EMANUELE X- a v. PERDUE, 693 So. 2d 1071 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)

. . . the jury determined that appellee did not sustain a permanent injury within the meaning of section 627.737 . . .

BLACK, v. CROWDER,, 693 So. 2d 649 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)

. . . Judge Owen’s opinion: “Automobile personal injury cases arising prior to the effective date of section 627.737 . . .

H. ENRIQUEZ, v. A. CLARK,, 692 So. 2d 941 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)

. . . See § 627.737(1), Fla. Stat. (1995). . . . with but found not to have caused permanent injuries, Enriquez may not avail herself of subsection 627.737 . . . (2). § 627.737(1); see Mansfield v. . . . She is therefore entitled to bring an action for pain and suffering under 627.737(2), and Enriquez is . . . accordingly not exempted from tort liability by subsection 627.737(1), nor is she entitled to set off . . .

RODRIGUEZ v. CIGNA PROPERTY AND CASUALTY COMPANY,, 956 F. Supp. 544 (M.D. Pa. 1996)

. . . loss of bodily function, permanent injury, significant permanent scarring or disfigurement, or death (627.737 . . .

KATZ v. GHODSI, 682 So. 2d 586 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)

. . . Rhodes, 614 So.2d at 497 n. 1; § 627.737(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (1991). . . .

W. FIRMANI v. C. GRANT,, 681 So. 2d 869 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)

. . . . § 627.737(2), Fla. Stat. (1995). The question of permanency was an issue in the case. . . .

ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, v. MANASSE,, 681 So. 2d 779 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)

. . . See § 627.737(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (1993). Plaintiff was eighteen at the time of this accident. . . . Comment 3 to Florida Standard Jury Instruction (Civil) 6.1 states: “Section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes . . .

KOKOTIS v. J. DeMARCO,, 679 So. 2d 296 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)

. . . are two statutes that may apply to this case— section 627.7372, Florida Statutes (1991), and section 627.737 . . . Kokotis, on the other hand, contends that the case is controlled by section 627.737, Florida Statutes . . .

L. HANNAH, v. NEWKIRK,, 675 So. 2d 112 (Fla. 1996)

. . . order to distinguish it from the calculations made in accordance with sections 627.736(1) and section 627.737 . . . Rivero, 620 So.2d. 987 (Fla. 1993), we held that section 627.737 of the Florida Motor Vehicle No-Fault . . . own PIP carrier and the percent that the tortfeasor was obligated to pay, in accordance with sections 627.737 . . .

M. STELLAS, v. ALAMO RENT- A- CAR, INC., 673 So. 2d 940 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)

. . . issue of noneconomic damages, for failure of plaintiffs to have established, in accord with section 627.737 . . . We disagree with the lower court’s decision to apply section 627.737 in this case. . . . Permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability, other than scarring or disfigurement. § 627.737 . . .

KAHLE a v. PREWITT,, 673 So. 2d 121 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)

. . . defendants below in this automobile injury case, asserted a no-fault threshold defense pursuant to section 627.737 . . . issue of whether appellants had the required security to qualify for the exemption provided by section 627.737 . . .

M. SIMPSON R. v. STONE,, 662 So. 2d 959 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)

. . . non-econom-ie damages for Lois Simpson, we conclude that, while the threshold finding of a section 627.737 . . .

N. PEVSNER, M. D. v. FREDERICK, 656 So. 2d 262 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)

. . . I suggest that the venerable "remedy” is much better and more accurate. .See, e.g., §§ 627.737(2) and . . .

NEWKIRK, v. L. HANNAH,, 655 So. 2d 241 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)

. . . or her own insurer, where the injury fails to reach the permanent injury threshold found in section 627.737 . . . verdict, principally relying upon the supreme court’s following comment: In accordance with sections 627.737 . . .

DUTCHER, v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, a, 655 So. 2d 1217 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)

. . . The court instructed the jury, however, pursuant to section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1987), that . . .

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, a v. S. HASSEN S., 650 So. 2d 128 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)

. . . Section 627.737(2), which describes the “injury” or “disease” requirements that must first be met, provided . . . The court began its analysis by noting that the underlying legislative theory of section 627.737 “is . . . The court also observed that section 627.737 furthers this objective by rewarding individuals who have . . . Hassen of having to satisfy the mandatory threshold requirements of section 627.737(2) before she is . . . This subsection continues to retain this language to the present day. § 627.737(2), Fla.Stat. (1993). . . .

CITY OF TAMPA, v. J. D. LONG,, 638 So. 2d 35 (Fla. 1994)

. . . City defended the lawsuit on the ground that Long had failed to satisfy the requirements of section 627.737 . . . Our decision in this case requires a construction of the no-fault law contained in section 627.737, which . . . The second issue concerns the proper jury instruction, given the provisions of section 627.737. . . . It stated: Section 627.737 permits a plaintiff to recover damages for pain, suffering, mental anguish . . . whole or in part of: ... (2) Permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability.” § 627.737 . . .

LUDWIG, v. L. LADNER, 637 So. 2d 308 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)

. . . See § 627.737, Fla. Stat. (1987). Mr. . . .

DAIGNEAULT v. GACHE,, 624 So. 2d 818 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)

. . . Automobile personal injury cases arising prior to the effective date of section 627.737, Florida Statutes . . . The effect of the No-Fault Law, section 627.737, Florida Statutes, was to foreclose damages for pain . . .

HOLMES, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY,, 624 So. 2d 824 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)

. . . challenges the trial court’s final judgment in this personal injury action brought pursuant to section 627.737 . . .

N. POLLARD, Jr. v. WILLIAMS CNA, 623 So. 2d 588 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)

. . . motorist may obtain pain and suffering damages without satisfying the threshold requirements of section 627.737 . . .

DAUKSIS, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY,, 623 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 1993)

. . . Section 627.737(2) provides: (2) In any action of tort brought against the owner, registrant, operator . . . The security referred to in section 627.737 is an insurance policy or other equivalent security which . . . for pain, suffering, mental anguish, and inconvenience unless the threshold requirements of section 627.737 . . . afforded the exemption from tort liability available under the provisions of sections 627.727(7) and 627.737 . . . Because F.S. 627.737(2) provides that the tort threshold requirements apply only to an owner, registrant . . .

MANSFIELD v. RIVERO, 620 So. 2d 987 (Fla. 1993)

. . . personal injury protection policy, rejecting the contention that the exemption contained in section 627.737 . . . court’s decision, finding that its holding would effectively repeal the exemption contained in section 627.737 . . . The following are the pertinent portions of the No-Fault Law applicable to the issues in this case: 627.737 . . . (d) Death. § 627.737(l)-(2), Fla.Stat. (1983) (emphasis added). In Lasky v. . . . It was not written with any consideration of the mutual exemption provisions of section 627.737. . . .

KETCHEN, v. DUNN, 619 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)

. . . See § 627.737(2), Fla.Stat. (1989). . . . The comments by the Standard Jury Instructions Committee state that "[sjection 627.737(2) does not define . . . A "see” cite of section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1991), and Smey follows. . . .

EASKOLD, v. RHODES, Jr., 614 So. 2d 495 (Fla. 1993)

. . . The jury found that Morey did not sustain a permanent injury under section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes . . . Under section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1985), a plaintiff is precluded from recovering damages in . . . injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability, "other than scarring or disfigurement." § 627.737 . . .

STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS- CIVIL CASES, 613 So. 2d 1316 (Fla. 1993)

. . . there is proof that a claimant will incur future damages that are not excluded from recovery by section 627.737 . . . See section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1991). 2. . . . See § 627.737(2), Fla.Stat. (1991); Smey v. . . . support the claim on the issue of permanency, then your verdict should be for the defendant.” 3.Section 627.737 . . .

SANDARAC ASSOCIATION, INC. a v. W. R. FRIZZELL ARCHITECTS, INC. a H. D. a, 609 So. 2d 1349 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)

. . . . § 627.737, Fla.Stat. (1991) (in which the no-fault threshold is a true bar to an existing cause of . . .

SMEY, v. WILLIAMS, 608 So. 2d 886 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)

. . . Section 627.737(1), Florida Statutes, provides that no action may be brought to recover damages for bodily . . .

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, v. GOMEZ,, 605 So. 2d 968 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)

. . . successfully argued that under the State Farm policy he need not satisfy the verbal threshold of section 627.737 . . . injured plaintiff may obtain pain and suffering damages without satisfying the verbal threshold. § 627.737 . . . injured plaintiff must satisfy the verbal threshold in order to obtain pain and suffering damages. § 627.737 . . . personal injury protection (PIP) coverage constitutes the providing of security for purposes of section 627.737 . . . The so-called verbal threshold is set forth in section 627.737(2), which states: In any action of tort . . .

COMMERCIAL CLEAN- UP ENTERPRISES, INC. T. v. HOLMQUIST J., 597 So. 2d 343 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)

. . . Section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1987) provides: In any action of tort brought against the owner . . .

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, v. DAUKSIS, 596 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)

. . . against his or her uninsured motorist carrier must meet and prove the permanency requirements of section 627.737 . . . and force Dauk-sis to prove that his injuries were permanent, beyond the threshold stated in section 627.737 . . . Dauksis argued that the tortfeasor could not have availed himself of the threshold defense from section 627.737 . . .

WILLIAMS, v. O. BROCHU,, 578 So. 2d 491 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)

. . . The jury’s finding of “no permanent injury”, a threshold finding necessary for recovery under section 627.737 . . .

RIVERO v. MANSFIELD, 584 So. 2d 1012 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)

. . . issues of damages and whether the Riveros crossed the permanent injury threshold requirement of section 627.737 . . . The Mansfields then requested the court to reduce the judgment by 80% pursuant to section 627.737, Florida . . . Section 627.737 permits a plaintiff to recover damages for pain, suffering, mental anguish, and inconvenience . . . whole or in part of: ... (2) Permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability.” § 627.737 . . .

POWELL, v. NAPOLITANO,, 578 So. 2d 747 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)

. . . . § 627.737(2), Fla.Stat. (1985). . . .

M. PEARSON, v. GREGG,, 575 So. 2d 333 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)

. . . As a threshold matter the appellee was required to prove under § 627.737(2)(b), Fla.Stat. that she had . . .

SCHULZ, v. REMY, 573 So. 2d 1076 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)

. . . This was error due to the application of section 627.737, Florida Statutes (1989). . . .

ESTATE OF WALLACE, v. FISHER,, 567 So. 2d 505 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)

. . . motor vehicle by the defendant Lisa unless the plaintiff first establishes, as required by section 627.737 . . .

POWERS, v. JOHNSON,, 562 So. 2d 367 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)

. . . comparative negligence on the part of Powers, denied that the injuries met the threshold set forth in section 627.737 . . . Section 627.737, Florida Statutes (1985) requires that in order to recover damages for pain, suffering . . . That subsection provides: 627.737 Tort exemption; limitation on right to damages; punitive damages.— . . . (d) Death. § 627.737, Fla.Stat. (1985). . . . .

B. NEWTON M. v. AUTO- OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY, 560 So. 2d 1310 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)

. . . The issue presented is whether a Florida insured must meet the threshold requirements of section 627.737 . . . arising out of the accident without the necessity of meeting the threshold requirements of section 627.737 . . . of action in that appellants admitted they had not sustained a permanent injury pursuant to section 627.737 . . . court entered an order, determining that appellants must meet the threshold requirements of section 627.737 . . . The section 627.737(2) limitation on tort damages specifies that— a plaintiff may recover damages in . . .